TRACING ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

A CHALLENGE TO MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM

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ABSTRACT

Over the course of the last few decades, the issue of "religious fundamentalism" has become the nexus for a widespread and oftentimes controversial discourse surrounding modernity, secularization, and extremism, religious and otherwise. Historically, "fundamentalism" can be traced back to the early decades of the twentieth century in the United States. However, over the course of the twentieth century, the application of the term "fundamentalism" increasingly targeted movements in other religious traditions, including Islam. Indeed, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the term "fundamentalism" has become virtually synonymous with Islamic fundamentalism and religious extremism. Because most accounts identify the early twentieth century as the time period in which religious fundamentalism came into existence, there is a general consensus that both religious and Islamic fundamentalism have a short history.

This thesis proposes to challenge this notion of a short history of religious fundamentalism by tracing and analyzing the development of pre-modern "fundamentalist" Islamic movements and figures, including eighteenth-century Wahhabism and Salafism, seventeenth-century Kadizadeli movements, fourteenth-century Ibn Taymiyya, and ninth-century Ibn Hanbal. The interconnected nature of these movements will be used to suggest the existence of an intellectual genealogy in which the ideals and tenets of these movements and figures can be traced back to their ideological roots in earlier Islamic histories. By situating an alternative history of Islamic fundamentalism, comprised of pre-modern Islamic movements and figures that are deemed to be fundamentalist, into the mainstream discourse on religious fundamentalism, this thesis will serve to challenge the current scholarship on fundamentalism, particularly the oft-utilized characterization of fundamentalism as an inherently modern response to modernity.

ABRÉGÉ

Aux cours de ces dernières décennies, la question du « fondamentalisme religieux » est devenue l'un des fils conducteurs de débats controversés et de plus en plus répandus au sujet de la modernité, la sécularisation et l'extrémisme, qu'ils soient de nature religieuse ou non. Historiquement, on peut retracer le concept de « fondamentalisme » jusqu'aux début du XXème siècle aux Etats-Unis. En revanche, l'utilisation de ce terme a évolué au cours du siècle pour cibler de plus en plus des mouvements appartenant à différentes traditions religieuses, notamment islamiques. En effet, après la révolution iranienne de 1979, le terme « fondamentalisme » est quasiment devenu synonyme de fondamentalisme islamique et d'extrémisme religieux. En outre, étant donné que la plupart des annales identifient le début du XXème siècle comme période d'émergence du concept de fondamentalisme, il existe un consensus universel selon lequel le fondamentalisme religieux et islamique a une histoire brève.

Notre thèse remet en question cette notion d'histoire brève en décrivant et en analysant certains mouvements et figures islamiques du fondamentalisme prémoderne, notamment le Salafisme et Wahhabisme du XVIIIème siècle, les mouvements Kadizeli du XVIIème siècle, Ibn Taymiyya au XIVème siècle et Ibn Hanbal au IXème siècle. Nous nous baserons sur la nature commune de ces mouvements pour suggérer l'existence d'une généalogie intellectuelle à travers laquelle les principes et idéaux de ces mouvement et figures notables peuvent être remontés jusqu'à certaines racines idéologiques ancrée dans l'histoire islamique antérieure. En situant une alternative à l'histoire du fondamentalisme islamique actuelle, composée de mouvements et de figures islamique prémodernes considérées fondamentalistes, au cœur du débat populaire autour du fondamentalisme religieux, notre thèse remet en question la littérature contemporaine au sujet du fondamentalisme religieux, en particulier la caractérisation répandue du fondamentalisme en tant que réponse moderne en soi à la modernité.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

On May 10th, 1995, Martin E. Marty, then the Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, presented a report to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences at its 1777th Stated Meeting.[1] Entitled "Too Bad We're So Relevant: The Fundamentalism Project Projected," Marty's report provided a comprehensive, albeit glowing, reflection on the Fundamentalism Project's initial objectives, methodology and processes, and its eventual results and findings. The project, codirected by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby of the University of Notre Dame, was an endeavor that spanned seven years, produced five volumes, and incorporated the work of almost two hundred scholars from across disciplines and the globe.[2] In addition to "looking back and summing up that effort" of an undertaking of such considerable scope and influence, Marty attempted to anticipate and address queries related to the project. First, Marty raised the question of whether the rise of fundamentalist movements in late modernity had been foreseen by academics and policy experts. Marty argued that academic and policy experts tended to envisage a far more "this worldly, secular, humanistic" future.[3] Marty also discussed the significance of his report's title: "Too Bad We're So Relevant." According to him, "the 'we' who claim to find ourselves relevant… are those whom the Academy chartered to do the Fundamentalist Project – those who directed it and the scholars who participated in it."[4] The sense of negativity implied in the phrase "too bad" alludes to the social, political, and religious concerns and tensions generated by fundamentalist movements.[5] Finally, in his self-congratulatory concluding remarks, Marty projected the project's future trajectory with the claim, "although the Fundamentalism Project has formally ended, the

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[1] Marty, Martin E. "Too Bad We're So Relevant: The Fundamentalism Project Projected" (1996), 22.
[2] *Ibid*, 22-23.
[3] *Ibid*, 26-27.
[4] *Ibid*, 27.
[5] *Ibid*, 28.

questions and agenda it has projected should, like the Academy itself, remain relevant for years to come."[6] That this prophecy of the Fundamentalism Project's continued relevance has been fulfilled is indisputable; however, the merits of the manifestations of this continued relevance have become contested, informing a debate that this thesis will explore at length.

In general terms, "religious fundamentalism" tends to be defined as an intense response to "changing conditions" that are interpreted by fundamentalists as a "challenge to their religious values."[7] R. Scott Appleby defines fundamentalism as a reactionary movement: "an identifiable pattern of religious militance in which self-styled true believers attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity by outsiders."[8] Within this framework of understanding, religious fundamentalists attempt to prevent a loss of their social and religious identity by appealing "to the past in order to find solutions for the present and future."[9] Indeed, over the course of the last few decades, the issue of "religious fundamentalism" has become the nexus for a widespread and oftentimes controversial discourse surrounding modernity, secularization, and extremism, religious and otherwise. As a result, there exist several competing definitions and formulations of the conceptual framework that underpins "religious fundamentalism," which has led, at times, to the conflation and misconstrual of basic concepts that ground the discourse. Thus, the need for greater clarity within the discourse warrants a closer examination of religious fundamentalism's underlying conceptual framework.

To that end, through this thesis I will seek to analyze the construction of "religious fundamentalism" as a global explanatory category that is deployed to describe a variety of religious movements, including those categorized as forms of "Islamic fundamentalism." I will

[6] Marty, "Too Bad," 38.
[7] Busuttil, James. "Policy Responses to Religious Fundamentalism" (2003), 231.
[8] Appleby, R. Scott. "Religions, Human Rights, and Social Change" (2003), 199.
[9] Haar, Gerrie ter. "Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change: A Comparative Inquiry" (2003), 5.

begin my analysis of the construction of "fundamentalism" by providing an overview of a key development in human history that arguably altered the trajectory of religion and global politics forever: the rise of modernity. In this first chapter, I will also present scholarly accounts of the purported relationship between modernity and the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism in order to frame subsequent discussions and analyses.

With a focus on "religious fundamentalism," in the second chapter, I will outline the conceptual origins of religious fundamentalism in the context of American Protestantism in the early twentieth century. I will also trace the development of the concept over the course of the twentieth century, particularly as the scope of its application shifted from a focus on the problem of internal religious modernization to a focus on modernization as an external secular threat to religious traditions as well as the expansion of the concept to include other religious traditions and contexts apart from its Protestant Christian origins.

In the second chapter, I will also move into an examination of the literature related to religious fundamentalism, identifying key definitions, trends, and theories in the scholarship. Here, while the thesis will focus on the Fundamentalism Project and its impact on the evolving scholarly discourse related to religious fundamentalism, I will also present alternative readings and histories of the development of religious fundamentalism.

In the third chapter of the thesis, I will concentrate on "Islamic fundamentalism" and provide an overview of the concept, markers and characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism, and associated literature. In this chapter, I will also discuss the development of modern Islamic fundamentalism by identifying and analyzing key modern Islamic movements and figures that were instrumental in the formation of this phenomenon.

In the final chapter, I will then explore pre-modern Islamic religious movements and figures that, in the literature, either may qualify for or have already been assigned a "fundamentalist" classification, including eighteenth-century Wahhabism and Salafism, seventeenth-century Kadizadeli movements, fourteenth-century Ibn Taymiyya, and ninth-century Ibn Hanbal. The interconnected nature of these movements will be used to suggest the existence of an intellectual genealogy in which the ideals and tenets of these movements and figures, particularly those of modern Islamic fundamentalism, can be traced back to their ideological roots in earlier Islamic histories.

Finally, building on the preceding chapters, the conclusion of the thesis will present my problematization of the scholarship's current deployment of its "modern fundamentalism" grand narrative, especially as applied to the category of Islamic movements. Through a critical analysis of the Fundamentalism Project itself, I will challenge the use of "fundamentalism" as a categorical descriptor. This challenge will also draw upon an alternative history of religious fundamentalism that can be read through the aforementioned pre-modern fundamentalist Islamic movements. By situating this alternative history, comprised of pre-modern Islamic movements and figures that are deemed to be fundamentalist, into the mainstream discourse on religious fundamentalism, this thesis will serve to challenge the current scholarship on fundamentalism, particularly the oft-utilized characterization of fundamentalism as an inherently modern response to modernity.

CHAPTER ONE: THE RISE OF MODERNITY

"Nothing is more characteristic of modernity than the immense variety and the frequency of radical change within it."[1] In this statement, political philosopher Leo Strauss underscores the complexity of the relationship between modernity and religious fundamentalism. The advent of the modern era in human history irrevocably altered the trajectory of human societies and precipitated a processed of "radical change" according to Strauss. As this chapter will demonstrate, this radical change was neither singular nor isolated. Instead, the rise of modernity resulted in a chain-reaction of radical changes, with one change shaping or being shaped by others. Indeed, diverse societies are still reckoning with the long-term effects and changes brought forth by the rise of modernity, including, among many other phenomena, religious fundamentalism, or as some refer to the phenomenon, "the resurgence of religion."

Although the specific timeline is somewhat contested, the rise of modernity is often dated to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, or the beginning of "the modern age."[2] This time period was also witness to the birth of several novel phenomena that became critical contributors to the rise of modernity, including modern science, capitalism, industrialization, colonial expansion, globalization, new political ideologies, and modern nation state formation.[3] The development of modernity into a formidable force of social change in its own right occurred throughout the modern era, deriving significant momentum from "the Enlightenment, the English and, especially, the American and French Revolutions, the birth of scientific method… and industry" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[4] With the "development and triumph of industrial society and of capitalism" during the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, the immense

[1] Strauss, Leo. "Three Waves of Modernity" (1975), 83.
[2] Lambert, Yves. "Religion in Modernity as a New Axial Age: Secularization or New Religious Forms?" (1999), 306.
[3] *Ibid*.
[4] *Ibid*.

significance of this formidable force of modernity was cemented.[5] Thus, the rise of modernity appears to have unfolded in three broad stages. In her conceptualization of modernity, scholar Yves Lambert argues that the rise of modernity in its entirety constitutes an axial age that can be periodized through three "axial moments": 1) the early "modern age" of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 2) the Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and 3) the triumph of industrialization and capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In a parallel manner, Leo Strauss also identifies "three waves of modernity," linking each way to a prominent contemporary scholar. The nature of the first wave of modernity, according to Strauss, is intellectually captured by the work of the infamous political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli (d. 1527). During this first wave, Strauss argues that thinkers like Machiavelli were heavily involved in the "reduction of the moral and political problem to a technical problem," as evidenced by Machiavelli's *The Prince*, a comprehensive and rather technical handbook for ruling monarchs.[6] The first wave also attempted to dismantle the notion that nature was "in need of being overlaid by civilization," thereby stripping power from an array of traditional societal structures that had heretofore commanded a certain level of authority, including notably religion and by extension, the Church. As will become clear, the loss of authority by a traditional societal structures as pervasive and significant as religion may have paved the way for the rise of religious fundamentalism in later centuries, particularly since religious fundamentalism may be considered to be a particular kind of response to the marginalization of religion in modern society.

Strauss identifies the second wave of modernity with another prominent political philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (d. 1778). Rousseau, a critic of modern despotism and

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[5] Lambert, 306.
[6] Strauss, 89.

bourgeois liberalism, wrote in opposition to the ill consequences of these developments, such as "the stifling spirit of the absolute monarch and the… cynical commercialism of the modern republics."[7] Following Rousseau, Strauss suggests that the second wave of modernity was marked by the abuse of power by ruling monarchs and industrialized commercialism alike. The third wave, in Strauss's formulation, is reflected in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1900) who critiqued "modern rationalism."[8] According to Strauss, the third wave of modernity brings into sharp relief the very crisis of modernity and liberal democracy, particularly as illuminated in the work of Nietzsche. Interestingly, while his analysis is focused on political philosophers and thinkers as opposed to historical moments and processes, Strauss's selection of Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Nietzsche aligns well with the three axial moments identified by Lambert above, as each thinker fits neatly into these respective epochs.

Although the three thinkers discussed above span the modern age, they are bound together by one common thread, the Enlightenment. Their ideas and works all connect to the Enlightenment period in some way: by influencing the development of Enlightenment thinking (Machiavelli), by contributing to its further development (Rousseau), or by reacting to it (Nietzsche). Indeed, of Lambert's three axial moments, the Enlightenment was a period of particular importance to modernity, and by extension, religious fundamentalism – to the extent that some scholars choose to date the onset of modernity to the Enlightenment period. The Enlightenment, a period in which scientific thought, rationalism, and individualism blossomed, seemed to decisively signify "a break with medieval Christianity" by rejecting the "preeminence of the medieval church as arbiter of truth and knowledge."[9] Furthermore, because of its emphasis on scientific method and rational inquiry, the Enlightenment was characterized by ideals of

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[7] Strauss, 89.
[8] *Ibid*, 98.
[9] Gedicks, Frederick M. "Spirituality, Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the End of Modernity" (2004), 1200.

"liberation" and the desire to cultivate a "freedom of beliefs" that challenged traditional sources of authority, such as scriptures and ecclesiastical institutions, or beliefs "whose truth or accuracy cannot be rationally or scientifically demonstrated."[10] These characteristic ideals and aims have come to be closely identified with the rise of modernity itself. Here, the implications are clear. As the Enlightenment unfolded, traditional religious beliefs and institutions lost power and stature in society; religion was, in a sense, demoted in favor of rationalism and liberalism. In this way, the evolving intellectual, religious, and political imagery of the Enlightenment provides a foil for the rise of religious fundamentalism.

In conjunction with the identification of phenomena associated with the Enlightenment and, by extension, modernity, a number of scholars have attempted to comprehensively conceptualize modernity by exploring some of its distinctive characteristics, features and aspirations. Charles Taylor has identified two ways in which scholars have sought to understand the rise of modernity and has subsequently proposed two categories into which their resulting theories can be sorted: cultural and acultural theories.[11] Whereas cultural theories emphasize the inherent differences between civilizations with individual cultures, Taylor contends that acultural theories, the predominant type, fit into the "development" paradigm due to their underlying notion that the disintegration of "traditional" societies and the rise of "modernity" are the inevitable products of social and intellectual progress.[12] Taylor further describes these acultural theories as conceiving of modernity as "the growth of reason" or social and intellectual changes, despite variance in the actual criteria utilized by these theories to measure such growth and change.[13] All acultural theories, Taylor argues, conceptualize modernity as "a set of

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[10] Gedicks, 1202.
[11] Taylor, Charles. "Two Theories of Modernity" (1995), 24.
[12] *Ibid*.
[13] *Ibid*.

transformations that any and every culture can go through – and that all will be probably be forced to undergo."[14] Whether the scholars previously referenced would fit neatly into this category of acultural theories is debatable, but Taylor's breakdown of modernity theories into cultural and acultural theories is definitely compelling, especially considering that the common characteristics of modernity, i.e. rationalism, industrialism, and democratization, that prevail in the scholarship align with the development paradigm cited by Taylor.

One feature frequently cited in scholarship as a key characteristic of modernity is rationalism, which is closely related to the development of scientific thought.[15] For example, Max Weber discusses "organizational continuities between such apparently diverse systems as rational bourgeois capitalism and socialism" with the context of "Occidental rationalism."[16] For Weber, "the most defining problem of the modern world was the expansion of formal rationality at the expense of other types of rationality."[17] According to Weber, formal rationalism has superseded all other types, or systems, of rationality, including, for instance, a system of rationality based on religious beliefs and principles. Zygmunt Bauman ties formal rationality and rationalism to modern bureaucracy. He asserts that both the particular form of rationalism that was developed in the modern era and its resulting bureaucratic structures can pose serious risks to the human condition. Bauman cites the Holocaust as a unique "product of modernity, not a result of a breakdown of modernity," as others have suggested.[18] Bauman is not the only scholar who makes an argument along these lines about the very essence of modernity and its characteristics. Developments in modern warfare and conflict lead some scholars to argue that modernity, as a phenomenon premised on formal rationalism, suffers from a lack of moral

[14] Taylor, "Two Theories," 24.
[15] See the works of Zygmunt Bauman, Max Weber, and Yves Lambert.
[16] Haferkamp, Hans and Neil Smelser. *Social Change and Modernity* (1992), 12.
[17] Ritzer, George. *Sociological Theory* (2010), 548.
[18] *Ibid*, 559.

compass that can lead to forms of ideological extremism and atrocities committed in the name of reason, like the Holocaust.

Another prevalent characteristic of modernity in the scholarship is the accompanying development of democracy and the desire for freedom.[19] A natural byproduct of rationalism and liberalism, the allure of democracy and freedom is said to have become more pronounced during later stages of modernity. The prominent American sociologist Talcott Parsons argues that the Renaissance and Reformation laid the social and ideological foundations democratic revolutions.[20] In Ron Eyerman's related discussion, however, the impact of political democracy "on essential rural and autocratic societies" is cited as a major factor in the "decisive origins" of modernity. Similarly, Reinhard Bendix argues that modernity is a direct result of the social changes that emerged in England and France in the aftermath of political revolutions (i.e. American and French Revolutions).[21]

Modernity has also been tied to the rise of globalization and internationalization. As Hans Haferkamp explains, as societies around the world become increasingly interconnected and interdependent, "modernity has transformed into a global phenomenon of sorts."[22] Early forms of globalization linked to European colonialism and Western expansionism also expose problematic features of these historical developments. Globalization as a key aspect of certain scholarly discussions of modernity shapes the evolving discourse on religious fundamentalism.

Although some scholars regard the globalization of modernity to be the globalization and dissemination of *one* particular modernity (often defined in terms of Western or Eurocentric modernity), other scholars have argued that there are, in fact, "multiple modernities." Sociologist

[19] See the works of Reinhard Bendix, Ron Eyerman, Karl Jaspers, and Talcott Parsons.
[20] Haferkamp, 14.
[21] *Ibid*.
[22] Haferkamp, 21-22.

Shmuel Eisenstadt has developed a theoretical framework of "multiple modernities." In his essay, "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of 'Multiple Modernities,'" Eisenstadt argues that the most effective way to understand the history of modernity, with its accompanying narratives related to "the religious dimension," is to understand it as the product of continuous "constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs of modernity…. of multiple modernities."[23] Eisenstadt contends that all societies that have undergone modernization have developed "distinct modern dynamics, distinctive ways of interpreting modernity, for which the original Western project constituted the crucial starting and continual – usually ambivalent – reference point but which often went beyond it."[24] Therefore, modernity has been experienced globally in a multitude of manifestations, each one corresponding to a particular historical and geographical context.

Charles Taylor appears to agree with Eisenstadt's assessment of the nature of modernity. In his aforementioned work related to cultural and acultural theories of modernity, Taylor also discusses the structural nature of modernity. He argues that "the belief that modernity comes from one single universally applicable operation imposes a falsely uniform pattern on the multiple encounters of non-Western cultures with the exigencies of science, technology, and industrialization."[25] In his defense of the notion of multiple modernities, Taylor also argues that not all cultures must "undergo a range of cultural changes drawn from our experience – such as 'secularization.'"[26] Instead, Taylor seems to extend Eisenstadt's theory of multiple modernities to posit the existence of multiple secularities as well, perhaps as a caveat to the scholarship's

[23] Eisenstadt, S.N. "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of 'Multiple Modernities" (2000), 592.
[24] *Ibid*.
[25] Taylor, "Two Theories," 26.
[26] *Ibid*, 28.

frequent tendency to identify a particular understanding of secularization as a defining characteristic of modernity.

The identification of secularization – or the loss of religious influence and/or religious belief at a societal level – as a defining characteristic of modernity is of particular importance to the discussion of religious fundamentalism.[27] In addition to being considered "a virtually inevitable outcome of modernization," secularization has been defined in at least three ways by the social sciences: 1) "the generally decreasing importance of religion," 2) "the retreat of religion from the public sphere," and 3) "the freeing of social subspheres (such as economy, science, art, or politics) from direct religious control."[28] In his classic definition, sociologist Peter Berger describes secularization as "the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols."[29]

The various definitions of secularization have formed the basis for the widely acknowledged and cited "secularization thesis," which contends that "processes of modernization more or less automatically lead to secularization."[30] Indeed, secularization, which is often used interchangeably with modernization, is considered to be the product of the rationalism and individualism that developed during the Enlightenment period. According to Frederick Gedicks, "although initially Enlightenment may have challenged only a certain kind of Christian thought, it eventually came to signify a secular challenge to all of Christianity and, indeed, all religion."[31] Thus, as rational thinking and the scientific method became the primary modes of logical inquiry, religious beliefs came to be viewed as illogical superstitions – unworthy of the label "knowledge" – and society began to be secularized. Hans Joas

[27] Mitchell, Philip. "Definitions and Characteristics of Modernity."
[28] Joas, Hans. "Cultural Memory in the Present: Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity" (2014), 9.
[29] Lambert, 324-325.
[30] Joas, 38.
[31] Gedicks, 1202.

characterizes this reading of secularization as a process at the end of which participants can enjoy the feeling "of having rid themselves of something that could only be an obstacle to progress, which everyone would ultimately abandon," in this case – religion.[32]

The "secularization thesis," in its various forms, tends to fall within a broader category of theories related to the process of secularization, namely subtraction theories. Subtraction theories, which consist of "stories of modernity in general, and secularity in particular," are premised on the notion that "human beings have lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge."[33] In other words, these humans have "subtracted" such limitations of knowledge, e.g. religion, from their worldviews, in part as a result of processes like secularization. Charles Taylor further explains the basic structure of the subtraction theory as the discovery of certain untenable features of an original worldview or perspective and the subsequent adoption of "what remains after the unacceptable elements have been peeled off, be this some kind of Deism, or world-soul, or cosmic force, or blank atheism."[34]

Taylor, however, challenges classic subtraction theory and suggests that the shift from religion to reason is "not a neutral and uncontestable fact, but part of the self-image of the Enlightened unbelief."[35] One of his major contentions with the classic subtraction theory is that it "runs together a number of factors" which ought to be separated, including disenchantment, homogeneity of time, accounting of the origins of human culture, and Biblical criticism.[36] As an alternative to the classic subtraction theory, Taylor identifies three types of secularity in his tome, *A Secular Age*. The first, Secularity 1, is characterized by secularized public spaces, while

[32] Joas, 9.
[33] Taylor, Charles. *A Secular Age* (2007), 22.
[34] *Ibid*, 270.
[35] *Ibid*, 273.
[36] *Ibid*, 271.

the second, Secularity 2, is characterized by the decline of belief and practice. The third secularity, however, Secularity 3, is the novel one. According to Taylor, Secularity 3 presents a new context with new conditions of belief, and it is within this context that "all search and questioning about the moral and spiritual must proceed."[37] Furthermore, the main feature of this new context is that it "puts an end to the naïve acknowledgement of the transcendent, or of goals or claims which beyond human flourishing."[38] For Taylor, this process unfolds through three phases in the development of contemporary Secularity 3. The first stage consists of the development of an exclusive humanist alternative to the Christian faith, while the second stage consists of the further diversification of alternatives. In fact, here, Taylor coins a signature term, "the Nova effect," to describe this phenomenon of diversification. According to Taylor, "the positing of a viable humanist alternative [to the original duality of belief and unbelief], set in train a dynamic, something like a nova effect, spawning an ever-widening variety of moral/spiritual options, across the span of the thinkable and perhaps even beyond."[39] Eventually, in the final phase of the development of Secularity 3, the fractured nature of the nova transfers from the realm of the elites to entire societies. These societies then experience a generalized culture of "expressive individualism, in which people are encouraged to find their own way, discover their own fulfillment, 'do their own thing'," thereby "shifting the place of the spiritual in human life" and creating a context that fosters a form of "spiritual super-nova."[40]

In the view of some scholars, modernization and consequently secularization are directly linked to the occurrence of religious fundamentalism. Because secularization often entails the loss of the domination of religious institutions and symbols in broader society, Taylor has

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[37] Taylor, "Secular," 20.
[38] *Ibid*, 21.
[39] *Ibid*, 299.
[40] *Ibid*, 299.

provided this phenomenon with an alternative label of "immanence." Taylor describes three forms that he contends the "malaise of immanence" may take: 1) "the sense of the fragility of meaning, the search for an over-arching significance," 2) "the felt flatness of our attempts to solemnize the crucial moments of passage in our lives," and 3) "the utter flatness, emptiness of the ordinary."[41] These varying forms all underscore one crucial aspect of secularization, that is, the marginalization of religion in society. According to Joas, it is this marginalization of religion that often provokes movements of "religious revitalization."[42] Joas, who conceptualizes secularization as having occurred in "waves," argues that these waves are "often followed by a massive countermovement," which frequently entails either a revitalization of religion, modernization of doctrine and/or organizational structures, or even retraditionalization.[43] Opposed to secularization, religious fundamentalists then emerge with a countercultural agenda that calls for the defense of religious beliefs and institutions in response to the marginalization they undergo at the hands of modernization and secularization. In other words, as traditional religious structures and institutions lose power and stature in society with the advent of modernity, a secular paradigm in which religion is either unwelcome or fully removed ("subtracted") is established. It is in opposition to this secular paradigm that fundamentalist movements arise.

[41] Taylor, "Secular," 309.
[42] Joas, 38.
[43] *Ibid*, 42.

CHAPTER TWO: RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM

I. *Fundamentalism: History*

In general terms, religious fundamentalism tends to be an intense response to "changing conditions" that are interpreted by fundamentalists as a "challenge to their religious values."[1] Often characterized as an inherently reactionary type of movement, religious fundamentalism is defined by R. Scott Appleby as "an identifiable pattern of religious militance in which self-styled true believers attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity by outsiders."[2] Within this framework of understanding, religious fundamentalists attempt to prevent the potential loss of their social and religious identity by appealing "to the past in order to find solutions for the present and the future."[3] Historically, however, religious fundamentalism was a phenomenon that was tied to and originated out of a very specific context: the American Protestant evangelical movement of the early twentieth century.

Originally employed to refer to a conservative subset of American Protestant evangelicals, the emergence of the term "fundamentalism" can be traced back to the early decades of the twentieth century in the United States. Indeed, the Christian Fundamentalist movement pioneered by these conservative American evangelicals obtained its very name from a series of twelve volumes published between 1910 and 1915, entitled "The Fundamentals." These volumes were "published and distributed free, in numbers ranging from 175,000 to 300,000 copies by two brothers who preferred to be known only as 'Two Christian Laymen'."[4] "The Fundamentals" were penned by conservative theologians who defended biblical inerrancy, the doctrine that the Bible is without error in all of its teachings, and attacked "the evils of what they

[1] Busuttil, 231.
[2] Appleby, "Religions," 199.
[3] Haar, 5.
[4] Sandeen, Ernest. "Towards a Historical Interpretation of the Origins of Fundamentalism" (1967), 77.

perceived to be secular, atheistic modernism."[5] According to Ernest Sandeen, "altogether 64 authors furnished a total of 90 articles" for these twelve volumes in which specific Christian doctrines were vigorously defended, including "the subject of Biblical authority."[6] Interestingly, despite the strong and rigorous defense mounted by the conservative Protestants in favor of "fundamentalism," Sandeen notes that the "tone of the volumes is quite calm" and that "though the articles are polemical, they are almost never vituperative."[7]

In addition to providing the theoretical and theological underpinnings of "The Fundamentals," these two foundational beliefs, biblical inerrancy and the evils of secular modernism, became the cornerstones of the Christian fundamentalism that developed in the early twentieth century. Although these conservative American evangelicals attained their "fundamentalist" identification in the early decades of the twentieth century, their ideas and beliefs were developed around the time of the Civil War in the United States, from roughly 1870 to 1925.[8] During this time period, there was a drive to draw religion itself into the process of modernization, challenging religion to either adapt to modernity's framework or become marginalized. Those who chose to transform, or even update, their religious beliefs in accordance with the principles and objectives of modernity came to be known as "modernists." This trajectory of religious thought, according to Roxanne Euben, held "modernist 'value orientations,' orientations reflective of and committed to 'the ascendance of reason, science and statist forms of social organization…' and a 'basic secularism…'"[9] This mode of belief and thought, "modernism," eventually led some religious adherents to forcibly transform Christian

[5] Mistzal, Bronislaw, and Anson Shupe. "Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: Revival of Religious Fundamentalism in East and West" (1992), 7.
[6] Sandeen, 78-79.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] Emerson, Michael and David Hartman, "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism" (2006), 129.
[9] Euben, Roxanne. "Premodern, Antimodern, or Postmodern? Islamic and Western Critiques of Modernity" (1997), 430.

theology itself to fit modernity's framework "by discarding the doctrines and beliefs which modernity had discredited."[10] Here, a distinction between modernity and modernism is crucial. In *Defenders of God*, Bruce Lawrence argues that modernity refers to "the processes associated with modernization, including but not limited to the 'increasing bureaucratization and rationalization as well as technical capacity and global exchange.'"[11] Modernism, on the other hand, refers to the "search for individual autonomy driven by a set of socially encoded values emphasizing change over continuity; quantity over quality; efficient production, power, and profit over sympathy for traditional value or vocations, in both the public and private spheres."[12]

While Lawrence presents a broad definition of modernism above, the concept of modernism is also situated in a very particular historical context. Modernism, as a process in which traditional systems of thought and belief were made to conform to the objectives and framework of modernity, manifested in both Protestant and Catholic thought and theology. According to Guy Haarscher, Protestant modernism was initially developed in Germany in the 1880s to advocate a "certain adaptation to contemporary society."[13] The system encouraged "the use of methods of modern science" in the deliberate undertaking "to adjust Christianity to modern needs by changing the emphasis in its message and by historically evaluating and restating the permanent significance of evangelical Christianity to human life."[14] In the view of early fundamentalists, Protestant modernism and its proponents sought to modernize Christianity in a way that disregarded its traditions and history and altered its very essence.

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[10] Gedicks, 1202-1203.
[11] Lawrence, Bruce. *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (1989), 27.
[12] *Ibid*.
[13] Haarscher, Guy. "Perelman's Pseudo-Argument as Applied to the Creationism Controversy" (2009), 363.
[14] Mathews, Shailer. *The Faith of Modernism* (1925), 22-23.

Catholic modernism also sought to modernize Christianity, with the hopes of "a synthesis between the essentials of Christianity and the assured results of [Biblical] criticism."[15] It further believed in the possibility of a reconciliation of "Catholicism with the results of a historical criticism."[16] According to George Tyrell, this reconciliation entailed "a re-reading or reinterpretation of [their] Catholicism so as to find room in it for accepted facts."[17] Similarly, Darrell Jodock suggests that the Catholic modernists were "seeking an alternative way of interpreting faith," particularly in the face of "the rigidities of neo-scholastic versions of Catholicism and its resistance to notions of historical development and change."[18]

Although the specific manifestations of modernism certainly varied from Catholicism to Protestantism, there were a number of similarities between the two forms of Christian modernism. For instance, like Protestant modernism, Catholic modernism also engaged in an attempt to bridge the distance between traditional Christianity and various dimensions of modernity as they sought to "understand Christianity in a form more compatible with modern knowledge."[19] In his book, *Church Unity*, Charles Augustus Briggs lists five additional similarities. The first similarity posited by Briggs is the use of the Biblical Criticism method by modernists who "accept its results without hesitation."[20] This method, as previously mentioned, was premised on the notion that human rationality is superior to revelation and scriptures. The second similarity is closely related as Briggs argues that the modernists also subjected Church history to methods of historical criticism. W.T. Conner elaborates on this point of historical criticism, claiming that the modernist objects "to what he conceives to be a shackling of the mind

[15] Tyrell, George. *Christianity at the Crossroads* (1909), xv.
[16] *Ibid*, 11.
[17] *Ibid*.
[18] Jodock, Darrell. *Catholicism Contending with Modernity* (2000), 2.
[19] Hynes, William J. "A Hidden Nexus between Catholic and Protestant Modernism: C.A. Briggs in Correspondence with Loisy, Von Hugel and Genochhi" (1987), 195.
[20] Briggs, Charles A. *Church Unity: Studies of Its Most Important Problems* (1909), 439.

by fastening on it the creeds of the past. He insists on the right of criticizing and judging the Bible as we criticize and judge all other literature."[21] Briggs further contends that modernists employ modern philosophy to study dogma and accept results yielded by modern science. In other words, as modernists attempted to reconcile their Christian beliefs with scientific and rational knowledge, they "denied biblical miracles and argued that God manifests himself through the social evolution of society."[22] Finally, Briggs identifies the common advocacy of Catholic and Protestant modernists in related to the "reform of the Church and its institutions in accordance with modern methods of government and discipline, and with scientific, social and economic principles," thereby effectively modernizing Christianity.[23]

In response to these attacks on what were perceived to be the basic tenets of Christianity, anti-modernists and conservatives alike advocated a return to the "fundamentals" in their rigorous defense of the Christian faith against the modernizing efforts of modernist Christians. The anti-modernists, who hailed from the Catholic tradition, emphasized the "alien character" of modern culture and "tried to draw a sharp line between modernity and Christianity."[24] They also "adopted an aggressive stance over anything they identified with modernity."[25] Interestingly, this stance was actively endorsed by papal authorities, who went to great lengths to oppose modernism and the threats it posed for Catholicism. In fact, Pope Pius X issued an encyclical on "the doctrines of the modernists" on September 8th, 1907: *Pascendi Domini Gregis*.[26] In *Pascendi*, modernists were "condemned with such vehemence, and the measures prescribed to prevent its growth were so stringent that it virtually slammed the door on any historical study of

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[21] Conner, W.T. "Fundamentalism vs Modernism" (1927), 102.
[22] Gedicks, 1202-1203.
[23] *Ibid*, 439-440.
[24] Jodock, 17.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] See Appendix A for the full text of the encyclical. (http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-x/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_19070908_pascendi-dominici-gregis.html)

the Bible, on theological creativity, and on church reform."[27] According to some accounts, the anti-modernist programs outlined and implemented as a result of *Pascendi* were ultimately successful in stifling modernism and placing "the full weight of the institutions against historical investigations of church doctrine and the Scriptures."[28]


As per Jodock's assessment, the anti-modernists' outlook on modernity was "similar to that of the fundamentalists who emerged in the United States during the same decades (1890-1910)."[29] Indeed, his assessment is quite accurate, as it was this deeply religious reaction to internal modernist forces that provided the impetus for the early twentieth century Christian fundamentalist response. According to some scholars, fundamentalists opposed modernism in three different ways: 1) "by (unsuccessfully) attempting to regain control of Protestant denominations, missions boards, and seminaries;" 2) "by supporting (with mixed success) Prohibition… and other measures defending traditional Protestant morality and sensibilities; and 3) by (fairly successfully) "attempting to stop the teaching of evolution in the public schools," a doctrine that was closely tied to German higher criticism.[30] Ultimately, these tensions between modernists and anti-modernists and conservatives came to be known as "the fundamentalists/modernist split."[31]

Although Christian fundamentalists initially attempted to stave off internal modernizing efforts from fellow Christians, the focus of their defensive endeavors eventually shifted from internal modernism to external marginalization of religious institutions and beliefs in American "secular" society over the course of the twentieth century. Indeed, the second of the two main

[27] Jodock, 1.
[28] Jodock, 8.
[29] *Ibid*.
[30] Eskridge, Larry. "Fundamentalism" (2012).
[31] Woodberry, Robert and Christian Smith. "Fundamentalism Et Al: Conservative Protestants in America" (1998), 27.

varieties of religious fundamentalism identified in the scholarship shifts the focus away from internal theological conflict to "targeting the secularization of society and the public sphere" and "adopting as main issues cultural and symbolic matters and issues related to morality and sexuality."[32]

As the twentieth century progressed, the exclusive application of the term "fundamentalism" to the American evangelical movement began to diminish; instead, the concept of "fundamentalism" expanded to encompass the tenets and describe modern movements within other religious traditions. This crucial development in the conceptual framework of fundamentalism is marked by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, when the term "fundamentalism" was first applied to a movement that boasted both a foundational ideology based in Islamic theology as well as a predominantly Muslim political uprising. Since then, the term fundamentalism has become synonymous with Islamic fundamentalism and extremism, whereas prior to 1979 it referred almost exclusively to the American Protestant phenomenon.[33]



This trend in the scholarship, along with the onset of modernism – in response to which fundamentalism arises, can be clearly seen in Graph 1 above. This graph, generated by the

[32] Ozzano, Luca. "Religious Fundamentalism" (2009), 157.
[33] Mistzal, 1.

Google Ngram Viewer, represents the frequencies with which the terms "modernism," "fundamentalism," and "Islamic fundamentalism" appear in sources printed between 1800 and 2017. As the graph clearly shows, the concept of modernism emerged prior to the reactionary concept of fundamentalism, which first appears around1920. The concept of Islamic fundamentalism, on the other hand, only comes into use after 1979, or as previously identified – the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran.

II. *Religious Fundamentalism: Literature Review*

In the last several decades, the use of the term "religious fundamentalism" has become increasingly widespread, featuring in a variety of interconnected discourses. Despite this widespread usage, however, a single, representative definition of "religious fundamentalism" remains elusive. Indeed, although the previous chapter of this thesis presented a basic definition of "religious fundamentalism" from the work of R. Scott Appleby, his definition does not represent any sort of consensus on the definition of religious fundamentalism. In fact, a cursory examination of the literature yields an array of definitions and conceptualizations of religious fundamentalism. In their review of literature related to religious fundamentalism, Michael Emerson and David Hartman outline an array of definitions that can be found throughout the literature. These definitions range from those with pejorative connotations, such as "any group that takes religion seriously or views religion's role in public life to be greater than the labeler would wish it to be," to those centered on quasi-religious political movements, such as "groups pushing for an overhaul of the national or global political system who are at best culturally

connected to a religion."[34] Interdisciplinary perspectives play into the diverse conceptualizations of fundamentalism.

Sociologist Martin Riesebrodt defines fundamentalism as "an urban movement directed primarily against dissolution of personalistic, patriarchal notions of order and social relations and their replacement by depersonalized principles."[35] According to Riesebrodt, fundamentalists are strongly opposed to the marginalization of their beliefs and practices, an effect of secularization as mentioned above. Political scientist Roxanne Euben, on the other hand, uses "fundamentalism" to refer to "contemporary religio-political movements that attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the community, excavating and reinterpreting these foundations for application to the contemporary social and political world."[36] Her analysis of religious fundamentalism hinges on the role of scripture and its significance for religious adherents, citing scripture as a key component of religious fundamentalist ideology and activity. Similarly, anthropologist Richard Antoun defines religious fundamentalism as a "protest against change and the ideological orientation of modernism," which allows for the metaphorical interpretations of scripture.[37] Finally, in his definition, comparative politics scholar Gabriel Almond highlights the militant nature of fundamentalists, defining religious fundamentalism as "a discernible pattern of religious militance by which self-styled 'true believers' attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors."[38] Although these definitions are distinct and highlight different aspects of religious fundamentalism, they share the common element of religious

[34] Emerson, 128-129.
[35] Riesebrodt, Martin. *Pious Passion: The Emergence of Modern Fundamentalism in the United States and Iran* (1993), 9.
[36] Euben, "Premodern," 432.
[37] Antoun, Richard. *Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements* (2001), 3.
[38] Almond, Gabriel; R. Scott Appleby; Emanuel Sivan. *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms Around the World* (2003), 17.

fundamentalists' opposition to secularization and religious marginalization through the advocacy of a return to basic doctrinal tenets. The opposition of religious fundamentalists to secularization, and by extension the marginalization of their beliefs and institutions, is considered to be a defining aspect of religious fundamentalism.

While the concept of religious fundamentalism has evolved in recent decades and definitions apparently vary from scholar to scholar, certain key assumptions underlying the scholarship on the subject have remained constant. One such assumption, a particularly essential element of the current scholarship on religious fundamentalism, has been the notion that fundamentalism is a strictly recent phenomenon. As noted above, a large majority of accounts related to the origins of fundamentalism have identified the early twentieth century as the time period in which the concept came into existence, often in opposition to modernism and modernization. Indeed, some scholars contend that "the historical conditions of the late twentieth century seem to have created a particular context of social and cultural change, subsumed in the term 'modernization', that is considered fertile ground for the rise of fundamentalist movements."[39] In a parallel manner, R. Stephen Walker discusses a school of thought, or a "new paradigm," that "argues that modernization and secularization serve as fertile soil for religious resurgence, especially of the more fundamentalist strains."[40] Consequently, there is a general consensus that "religious fundamentalism has a rather short history," and this consensus informs much of the literature concerning the formation and development of religious fundamentalism.[41]

Arguably, religious fundamentalism is considered to have this "short history" because the concept's underlying framework is premised on the notion that religious fundamentalism is a direct result of or response to modernity, and that by extension, modernity is a necessary

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[39] Haar, 1.
[40] Emerson, 133.
[41] Emerson, 130.

condition for the existence of religious fundamentalism. In this vein, Lorne Dawson hypothesizes that fundamentalism is "the product of some basic accommodation to the realities of modernity, which has secured a permanent place for religion in the contemporary world, but in a much reduced capacity and with diminishing significance."[42] Here too, religious fundamentalism is defined strictly in terms of its negative reaction to modernity. Similarly, in their introduction to "Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: Revival of Religious Fundamentalism in East and West," Bronsilaw Mistzal and Anson Shupe hypothesize about the rise of global fundamentalism. They state that, "for the individual mind caught between two types of hegemonic yet contradictory secular and religious explanations of modernity… there exists a generically fundamentalist religious response to the modern world situation that is the monopoly of no single faith."[43] In this conceptualization of religious fundamentalism, Mistzal and Shupe suggest that individuals in the modern era are faced with a choice between either a secular or religious outlook, and more importantly, that these two outlooks are mutually exclusive. Thus, this conceptualization of global fundamentalism might serve to reinforce the notion that modernity is a necessary condition for the existence of religious fundamentalism.

Furthermore, the very nature of modernity and its associated processes of secularization and modernization have been linked directly to the reactionary rise of religious fundamentalism. As Charles Taylor explains, the malaises of modernity – the sense of "a loss of roots," the overwhelming "hubris that denies human limits and denies our dependence on history or God," and "a trivializing self-indulgence" – can generate various responses to these perceived discontents, including religious fundamentalism.[44] Manochehr Dorraj also posits that the nature

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[42] Dawson, Lorne. "Anti-Modernism, Modernism, and Postmodernism: Struggling with the Cultural Significance of New Religious Movements" (1998), 132.
[43] Mistzal, xi.
[44] Taylor, "Two Theories," 25.

of the relationship between religious fundamentalists and modernity is largely influenced by a rejection of modernity. He claims that "in the age of ideology and mass politics in which the realm of the sacred has become increasingly politicized, revivalists [fundamentalists] have become oppositional, rejecting the established secular ethos and its elite guardians."[45] Thus, it is not surprising that religious fundamentalists, who seek to preserve their foundational religious beliefs and institutions in a historical time and place that actively marginalizes them, would rise in opposition to and reject such a modernity – one that removes the importance of religion and morality from society.

Taking this analysis one step further, the scholarship posits that not only is religious fundamentalism itself a modern phenomenon, but the very methods it employs (e.g. social media) in its response to modernity are also products of modernization.[46] S.N. Eisenstadt explains, for example, that the distinctly modern characteristics of these movements are evident "in the use of modern communication technologies, and of modern propaganda techniques."[47] Martin Marty's analysis of fundamentalist movements in his introductory piece to *Fundamentalisms Observed* provides support for Eisenstadt's position. Marty also argues that fundamentalists "exist in a type of symbiotic relationship with the modern, finding, for example, technology, mass media of communications, and other instruments of modernity congenial to their purposes."[48] A cursory analysis of recruiting strategies employed by contemporary terrorist organizations also provides compelling support for these claims, particularly ISIS's Twitter-based campaigning and recruitment. Even the ideological structure of religious fundamentalism follows in the groove of other forms of modern radicalism. In the apt phrasing of Eisenstadt, who

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[45] Dorraj, Manochehr. "The Crisis of Modernity and Religious Revivalism: A Comparative Study of Islamic Fundamentalism, Jewish Fundamentalism and Liberation Theology" (1999), 228-229.
[46] Ozzano, 149.
[47] Eisenstadt, 601.
[48] Marty, Martin. *Fundamentalisms Observed* (1991), vii.

presents a broader argument related to the motivations and essence of fundamentalist movements, a close analysis of fundamentalist movements reveals that "they promulgate distinct visions of modernity formulated in the terms of the discourse of modernity, while attempting to appropriate modernity on their own terms."[49] This assessment seems to suggest that religious fundamentalists vilify modernity and oppose it vehemently, all the while simultaneously employing, or appropriating, the technologies and advancements it offers. Thus, by establishing that religious fundamentalism is a direct response to modernity and that it employs modern tools in its response, the scholarship is able to conclude that religious fundamentalism is an inherently modern phenomenon that seeks to address the ills created by modernization, and consequently, secularization.

The preceding account of religious fundamentalism, characterized by the notion that religious fundamentalism is a modern reaction to modernity, is the predominant one that pervades the literature. Indeed, even the very early scholarly works on religious fundamentalism feature this account in one form or another. For instance, the first comprehensive scholarly work on religious fundamentalism, *Defenders of God* by Bruce Lawrence, "set the frame for the interpretation of fundamentalists' behavior towards modernity."[50] Lawrence further argued that "'fundamentalists are moderns but not modernists', since they accept the instrumental side of modernity, but refuse its values reorientation."[51] An influential body of scholarship on religious fundamentalism also emerged from Europe, with contributions from Enzo Pace (Italy), Thomas Meyer (Germany), and Martin Riesebrodt (Germany). Riesebrodt's definition of fundamentalism, cited above, considered the phenomenon to be caused primarily by "the dramatic reduction in chances of the traditionalist milieu to reproduce itself culturally under

[49] Eisenstadt, 600.
[50] Ozzano, 149.
[51] *Ibid*.

conditions of rapid urbanization, industrialization, and secularization," or in other words, modernity.[52] Another early take on the relationship between fundamentalism and modernity is presented in Gilles Kepel's book, *La Revanche de Dieu* ("The Revenge of God"). In it, Kepel discusses the phenomenon of the recent global resurgence of religion, arguing that "new extremist religious movements were the products of the displacement – 'a deep social disquiet' – caused by the fast social and political changes marking out the contemporary era."[53]

Arguably, this scholarship provided precursory material for the academic project on religious fundamentalism that would come to be unrivaled in scope and influence. This project was the "Fundamentalism Project, directed by R. Scott Appleby and Martin Marty in the 1990s. The monumental project, which was commissioned in partnership by the University of Chicago and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1989, "convened 10 conferences involving more than 100 scholars with expertise in fundamentalist movements around world."[54] Because the objective of the project was to explore and explain religious fundamentalism from a multitude of angles, perspectives, and disciplines, a series of five edited volumes were published from 1991 to 1995.[55] The volumes include: *Fundamentalisms Observed* (1991), *Fundamentalisms and Society* (1993), *Fundamentalisms and the State* (1993), *Accounting for Fundamentalisms* (1994), and *Fundamentalisms Comprehended* (1995).

The first volume, *Fundamentalisms Observed*, is comprised of case studies of fourteen global movements that explore shared commonalities, namely fundamentalist inclinations. The findings of the studies suggest that fundamentalists within these historic religious traditions are "convinced of the conspiratorial nature of secularists and liberal religionists" and "adopted a set

[52] Riesebrodt, 9-19.
[53] Ozzano, 149.
[54] Appleby, R. Scott and Martin Marty. "Fundamentalism" (2002), 22.
[55] *Ibid*.

of strategies for fighting back against what is perceived as a concerted effort by secular states or elements within them to push people of religious consciousness and conscience to the margins of society."[56] Published simultaneously as companion volumes in 1993, the second and third volumes explore "the extent of influence of fundamentalist movements in six 'zones' or spheres human existence": scientific research and technology, gender roles and patriarchy, educational systems and communications networks, politics, lawmaking, and economics.[57] The fourth volume, *Accounting for Fundamentalisms*, "explores the dynamic character of religious radicalism as it moves into or away from a fundamentalist mode of relating to the outside world."[58] The final volume in the series, *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, takes the form of a capstone statement that reflects on and assesses the findings of the entire Fundamentalism Project. In this volume, contributors "test the project directors' original characterization of fundamentalism as a reactive, selective, absolutist, comprehensive mode of anti-secular religious activism."[59]

As the first and only research project on religious fundamentalism undertaken on this scale, the Fundamentalism Project marked both the beginning and the end of "the pioneering phase in research on fundamentalism."[60] Not only has the Fundamentalism Project essentially created and developed the framework in which religious fundamentalism is analyzed, it has also left an indelible mark on any subsequent research on religious fundamentalism. Indeed, many scholars have noted this long-lasting legacy of the project, including Sherrie Aeschliman and David Rapoport. In her review of *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, Aeschliman states that any scholars or academics interested in studying fundamentalism "will benefit from familiarity with

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[56] Marty, Martin and R. Scott Appleby. *Fundamentalisms Comprehended* (1995), 1.
[57] Marty, *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, 2.
[58] *Ibid*, 3.
[59] *Ibid*, 5.
[60] Ozzano, 149.

the content of the Fundamentalism Project simply because it is bound to frame the scholarly debate for some time to come."[61] Likewise, David Rapoport remarks that "no one will discuss fundamentalism without seriously considering its [the Fundamentalism Project's] products."[62] Finally, David Watt suggests that the Fundamentalism Project "has perhaps done more than any other scholarly initiative to shape the way that academics think about religious revitalization movements in the modern world."[63] The Fundamentalism Project's sheer dominance of the scholarship related to religious fundamentalism is evident, and the simple fact is that there is no comparable compilation of scholarly works and essays on the subject that can adequately challenge the Fundamentalism Project's dominant status in academic discourse on the topic.

The extent of the Fundamentalism Project's pervasive impact on subsequent scholarship becomes even more apparent when its conceptualization of religious fundamentalism is considered. According to the "User's Guide" proffered in the first volume of the Project's series, modern religious fundamentalism generally displays five features that are outlined in terms of "fighting." The first feature of religious fundamentalism identified is "fighting back": "fundamentalists begin as traditionalists who perceive some challenge or threat to their core identity, both social and personal… [and] they fight back."[64] The second feature is that fundamentalists "fight for" their inherited or adopted worldviews by constantly reinforcing them against perceived attacks.[65] Third, fundamentalists "fight with" a carefully selected "repository of resources" that is adopted from "real or presumed pasts" and "actual or imagined ideal

[61] Aeschliman, Sherrie. "Review: Fundamentalisms Comprehended by Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby" (1997), 79.
[62] Rapoport, David. "Review: Fundamentalisms Comprehended by Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby" (1996), 679.
[63] Watt, David. "The Meaning and End of Fundamentalism" (2004), 272.
[64] Marty, *Fundamentalisms Observed*, ix.
[65] *Ibid*.

original conditions and concepts."[66] Next, fundamentalists are said to "fight against" those who are considered to be "agents of assault on all that is held dear;" these agents may include infidels, modernizers, and even moderates within the movement.[67] Finally, Marty claims that fundamentalists "fight under God" because as participants in religious fundamentalist movements, they "are convinced that they are called to carry out God's purposes against challengers."[68]

Over the course of the Project, the conceptualization of religious fundamentalism outlined above is further debated and refined. Thus, in their contribution to the capstone volume, *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, Gabriel Almond, Emmanuel Sivan, and Scott Appleby identify nine recurring features of modern religious fundamentalisms, five of which pertain to ideology and four of which apply to the structural organization of movements. The five ideological characteristics are identified as: 1) reactivity to the marginalization of religion, or "the erosion of religion and its proper role in society"; 2) selectivity, whether that takes the form of selecting particular pieces of tradition to defend or modernity to oppose; 3) moral Manicheanism, or the perception that "the world outside is contaminated, sinful, doomed"; 4) absolutism and inerrancy in the form of the "affirmation of the absolute validity of the 'fundamentals' of the tradition"; and 5) millennialism and messianism, or the promise of "victory" for the true believers.[69] The authors then continue to identity four structural elements of religious fundamentalist movements: 1) an elect, or "a chosen, divinely called membership"; 2) sharp boundaries "between the saved and the sinful"; 3) authoritarian organization characterized by a "leader-follower relationship in which the follower imputes extraordinary

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[66] Marty, *Fundamentalisms Observed*, xi.
[67] *Ibid*, x.
[68] Marty, *Fundamentalisms Observed*, x.
[69] Almond, Gabriel, Emmanuel Sivan, and R. Scott Appleby. "Fundamentalism: Genus and Species" (1995), 405-407.

qualities" to the leader; and 4) behavioral requirements that serve to "create a powerful affective dimension, an imitative, conforming dimension."[70] After identifying these nine features of fundamentalisms, Almond, Sivan and Appleby assert that "the 'function' of fundamentalism is to provide a socially organized release valve for the passions of modernity's discontents."[71] The parallels between the Fundamentalism Project and the previously outlined research are clear; much of the literature, in fact, features these nine characteristics as well as the notion that fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon that arises from a deep-seated opposition to modernity and its perceived ills.[72]

Furthermore, not only are there close connections between the Fundamentalism Project's conceptualization of religious fundamentalist and that of preceding scholarship, but there are also striking similarities between the Project and subsequent scholarship – a testament to the influence of the Project's conceptual framework. For instance, Mistzal and Shupe also outline common characteristics of global fundamentalist religious movements. In their formulation, these movements feature fundamentalist leaders who "issue a call to return to a pristine tradition now largely abandoned," an abandonment that is a strong marker of "a society gone astray."[73] In addition, Mistzal and Shupe argue that "modern revival is conscientiously aligned with both the mythic tradition and the modern world to build credibility in its potential for realizing significant change."[74] Similar to the Fundamentalism Project's conceptualization, Mistzal and Shupe also seem to be suggesting that modern religious fundamentalists pick and choose elements of modernity to embrace and oppose, perhaps, for example, by utilizing modern tools in their

[70] *Ibid*, 407-408.
[71] Aeschliman, 79.
[72] See Appendix B for a table detailing the nine characteristics of fundamentalist groups.
[73] Mistzal, 7.
[74] *Ibid*.

opposition to modernity. They also selectively pick and choose which elements of "tradition" to affirm and promote as countervailing values to modernity.

Another study that draws upon the work of the Fundamentalism Project is presented by Professor Gerrie ter Haar in her edited volume, *The Freedom to Do God's Will*. In her introduction, Haar focuses on identifying patterns and similarities among religious fundamentalisms, ultimately forming a list of such similarities. The first shared value among religious fundamentalists is the desire for "a return to traditional values and an accompanying sense of restoration."[75] The next common characteristic is the "search for a new identity, often at the expense of minority groups."[76] The third pattern, according to Haar, is "a preoccupation with moral concerns that tends to have an adverse effect on the position of women," while the final pattern identified is "a spirit of militancy with which these objectives are pursued."[77] Some scholars have suggested that these characteristics are the result of "changing conditions," which are viewed by fundamentalists as "a challenge to their religious values."[78] That fundamentalists are reacting defensively to perceived challenges to their religious values and institutions has been clearly demonstrated by the scholarship, and thus, such a claim appears to be plausible, especially within the Fundamentalism Project's framework of religious fundamentalism.

Although the bulk of academic literature on religious fundamentalism draws inspiration from the Fundamentalism Project, there are some alternative, albeit limited, accounts of fundamentalism. In his comprehensive overview of the literature on religious fundamentalism, Luca Ozzano outlines four such alternative conceptualizations: 1) fundamentalism as an effect of

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[75] Haar, 6.
[76] *Ibid*.
[77] *Ibid*.
[78] Busuttil, 231.

globalization, 2) fundamentalism as a symptom of the clash of civilizations, 3) fundamentalism as totalitarianism, and 4) fundamentalism as a niche of the religious market.

The first alternative account treats fundamentalism as an effect of globalization through its relation to international and/or transnational dynamics.[79] In support of this account, Ozzano references Roland Robertson, who initially argues that fundamentalism is a response to globalization, but later conceptualizes fundamentalism as "a direct effect" of globalization. Ozzano also cites Mistzal and Shupe who formulate a theory of "global fundamentalism" (outlined above) that maintains "an idea of fundamentalism as a reaction to globalization oriented towards creating and maintain peculiar identities."[80] The final scholar referenced by Ozzano in support of this alternative conceptualization of religious fundamentalism is Benjamin Barber. Barber contends that there are "two powerful forces acting within modernity": one, "regressive collective identities," and two, "forces of neo-liberal globalization."[81]

The second alternative conceptualization of religious fundamentalism treats fundamentalism as a symptom of the clash of civilizations. Here, Ozzano cites Samuel Huntington, author of *The Clash of Civilizations*, who argues that fundamentalism is "an extreme version of 'reformism'" that tries to merge modernization and the preservation of local values.[82] Mark Juergensmeyer, on the other hand, describes fundamentalism as a form of "religious nationalism" that "struggles for a revival of religion in the public sphere against Western secularism" and opposes the immorality of the West as well as its failed exported institutions.[83]

A third account views fundamentalism as a form of totalitarianism. One of the first scholars to treat religious fundamentalism in this way is Ernest Gellner. Focusing on Islamic

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[79] Ozzano, 150.
[80] Ozzano, 151.
[81] *Ibid*, 150.
[82] *Ibid*.
[83] *Ibid*

fundamentalism in particular, Gellner argues that “Islam fulfills some of the very functions which nationalism performs elsewhere, namely the transition to a modern society,” and in this way, religious fundamentalism takes the shape of a political entity navigating modernity with religion as its compass.[84] Shmuel Eisenstadt, however, argues that religious fundamentalism is heavily influenced by Jacobin tendencies, and is actually advancing “a modern Jacobin anti-modern utopia and heterodoxy.”[85] Eisenstadt also compares religious fundamentalism to forms of totalitarian communism, particularly in terms of structure and objectives.

The fourth and final account of religious fundamentalism outlined by Ozzano is that of fundamentalism as a niche of the religious market. In this category of research, scholars attempt to analyze religions “with the tools provided by the ‘rational choice’ [theory].”[86] In particular, Rodney Stark and Roger Finke represent this approach with their thesis that “religious demand takes on a bell curve based on benefits and costs demanded by certain strains of religion.”[87] As for the case of religious fundamentalism, Stark and Finke argue that although fundamentalist sects impose higher costs on individuals, they are able to provide them with “even higher, mostly identity-related, benefits,” and thus, an individual’s choice to join a fundamentalist movement is reduced to a cost-benefit analysis. According to this account, religious adherents can, in a sense, consume religion as a commercial product that provides certain sacred and profane benefits, e.g. eternal reward, strong identity, in exchange for specific costs, such as behavioral restrictions.

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[84] *Ibid*, 151.
[85] Ozzano, 152.
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] *Ibid*.

CHAPTER THREE: ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Despite the transformations it has undergone, the concept of religious fundamentalism has developed and retained a core set of defining characteristics. Standard conceptualizations of fundamentalism can be said to frequently feature defensive reactions to the perceived marginalization of religious beliefs and institutions vis-à-vis secularization, Manichean impressions of the world as sharply divided between the moral and immoral, and mandates to protect religious and traditional beliefs against the corrosive power of the modern.

Several of these characteristics can also be observed in the manifestations of religious fundamentalism in Islamic contexts. According to current scholarship, these Islamic fundamentalist movements are often characterized by deep-seated apprehensions of secularism, firm beliefs in absolute divine sovereignty, contentions of the moral bankruptcy of modern Western states (and of modern society more generally), and strong drives to action.[1] Furthermore, the members of such movements are often labeled as "Muslims who are thought to adhere strictly to ancient doctrines, to literal readings of the Koran, and are determined to resist modernity and modernization."[2] Here, it is important to note that standard conceptualizations of Islamic fundamentalism frequently identify followers' deep mistrust and wariness of modernity, modernization, and secularism as essential components of Islamic fundamentalist ideology. However, as this thesis will proceed to demonstrate, the rise of modernity and secularism are not necessary conditions for the emergence and development of Islamic fundamentalist movements. Rather, modernization and secularism may be more aptly categorized as two of the

[1] Euben, Roxanne. "When Worldviews Collide: Conflicting Assumptions about Human Behavior Held by Rational Actor Theory and Islamic Fundamentalism (1995), 163-165.
[2] Watt, David. "What's in a name? The Meaning of 'Muslim Fundamentalist'" (2008).

aforementioned "changing conditions" to which fundamentalists may respond, as opposed to exclusive conditions that give rise to fundamentalist movements.

The notion that Islamic fundamentalist movements only exist in response to modernity, a notion that is likely a product of the Fundamentalism Project's far-reaching influence, is only one aspect, or perhaps oversimplification, of the multifaceted realities of such movements. Indeed, in more general terms, Islamic fundamentalism customarily exhibits a reaffirmation of foundational principles, an effort to reshape society in accordance with those reaffirmed fundamentals, exclusivist and literalist interpretations of Islam's fundamentals and scriptures, and a rigorous pursuit of sociomoral reconstruction.[3] As described by Muslim fundamentalists themselves, their movements are predicated upon an effort "to call Muslims back to the path of Islam" as well as "an assertive surge of Islamic feeling."[4]

The first characteristic embodied by Islamic fundamentalist movements is the reaffirmation of foundational principles. Although the exact selection of foundational principles may vary from movement to movement, there does seem to be a consensus among fundamentalists that Muslims, and perhaps society more generally, must "endeavor to purify pristine Islam from subsequent accretions and alien influences."[5] Put simply, these movements are driven by the desire to "restore the original teachings of the Qur'an and Sunna" as they reject "later developments in Islamic theology, law, and philosophy."[6] Thus, language that advocates a "call for return to the Qur'an and Sunna," "revival of pristine Islam," and "affirmation of pristine Islam" abounds in Islamic fundamentalist circles.[7] In order to successfully return to this alluring

[3] Voll, John O. "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan" (1991), 347.
[4] *Ibid*.
[5] Arjomand, Said Amir. "Unity and Diversity in Islamic Fundamentalism" (1995), 170-180.
[6] Ahmad, Mumtaz. "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat" (1991), 462.
[7] See the works of John Voll, Mumtaz Ahmad, and Manning Nash respectively.

(and somewhat elusive) pure and pristine Islam, Islamic fundamentalists must revisit the teachings and practices of the earliest generations of Muslim followers. As fundamentalists idealize the past as a "golden age of purity," they seek to, in some sense, reconstruct the "salaf," or the practices and beliefs of Prophet Muhammad and his immediate followers.[8] The desire to return to the times and practices of the salaf is one that figures prominently into the aspirations and objectives of Muslim fundamentalists, particularly since the underlying belief is that "the earthly power and success of the first generation of Muslims were due to their strict adherence to the pure faith, to the fundamentals of Islam."[9] Furthermore, there is a pervasive perception among Muslims generally and Muslim fundamentalists especially that only through the strict application and embodiment of the ideals and practices of the early Muslim communities can later generations of Muslims prosper.

The second characteristic, an effort to reshape society in accordance with reaffirmed foundational principles, is also prevalent in the scholarship related to Islamic fundamentalism. Furthermore, this effort is closely tied to the desire of fundamentalists to reconstruct the salaf, since it is the very foundational principles embraced and modeled by the salaf, in accordance with which fundamentalists aim to reshape society. For instance, the ambition to "recreate the socioreligious system established under the direct guidance of the Prophet and his first four successors – 'the rightly guided caliphs'" – is referred to as one of the "core ideas of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism."[10] Some scholars, however, would argue that this emphasis on the pivotal significance of the practices of the salaf does not accurately depict the motivations of the fundamentalists. These scholars contend that Islamic fundamentalists actually "view themselves as the moral guardians and saviors of their societies, which they condemn as

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[8] Nash, Manning. "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia" (1991), 732, 695.
[9] Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. "Activist Shi'ism in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon" (1991), 405.
[10] Ahmad, 462.

living in a state of apostasy, moral depravity, and social decadence."[11] This portrayal hinges upon an assessment of Islamic fundamentalists' views towards their societies as a "profound mistrust of all notions of human progress, gradual evolution or historical development."[12]

Many Islamic fundamentalist ideas and objectives, in turn, reflect the third characteristic of fundamentalist movements – exclusivist and literalist interpretations of Islamic tenets and scriptures. Indeed, such interpretations facilitate the use of "traditions of Islam as a blueprint to build a more just society through the application of Koranic law," and thereby engage in sociomoral reconstruction.[13] More specifically, in fundamentalists' literal readings of foundational scriptures, the "Qur'an, Hadith, and Shariah are presented, without much theological debate or subtlety of interpretation, as the reliable and unwavering font of normative belief and behavior."[14] Furthermore, because fundamentalists view themselves as "moral guardians and saviors of their societies," they believe that they themselves have been "entrusted with discovering and implementing the will of God through the literal reading of the Qur'an, which they hold to be manifestly clear, unambiguous and categorical, irrespective of the contingencies of time and place."[15] Ultimately, these literalist readings, in conjunction with the desire to return to pristine Islam, result in the explicit ambition to create "an ideal society based on Islamic tenets in the context of contemporary reality.[16]

It is these aforementioned foundational principles – the idealization of a "pure" past, the connected perception of the infallibility of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors (the salaf), and the need to reestablish that purity – that define Islamic fundamentalist

[11] Haar, 29.
[12] Haar, 29.
[13] Watt, "What's in a name?"
[14] Nash, 732.
[15] Haar, 29.
[16] Nash, 732.

movements throughout history. Thus, it appears that Muslim fundamentalists can be identified as Muslim practitioners who are deeply concerned with the immoral state of their societal surroundings, believe that specific interpretations of Islam provide the correct methodology to ameliorate this immoral state, and actively engage in implementing that methodology – whether in their personal lives or in their communities and societies.

Although Islamic fundamentalism is generally perceived to embrace a uniform set of motivations and objectives, prominent Muslims thinkers in the modern era have taken divergent approaches in their development of Islamic fundamentalist ideology. In his contribution to *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Abdulaziz Sachedina outlines two directions in which Islamic fundamentalists proceed to mitigate the challenges presented by the "conflict between 'the religion which God has appointed and the historical development of the world which He controls'."[17] The first direction can be characterized by a "modernist" orientation that calls for "protesting and resisting alien domination in any form over the Islamic character of Muslim societies."[18] The second direction features a "reformist" orientation that encompasses the objective of "introducing reforms to prevent further internal deterioration of Islamic religious life."[19] Proponents of both approaches, however, "are critical of the West and advocate a return to Islam as an alternative to Western capitalism and communism."[20] In this advocacy, each approach "reflects the belief that rectification of the plight of modern Islam requires the recognition and reappropriation of Islam as a total way of life."[21]

In some ways, both approaches, by virtue of their belief that any solution to the "plight of modern Islam" requires a return to the foundational principles of Islam, exhibit a particular type

[17] Sachedina, 405.
[18] *Ibid*.
[19] *Ibid*.
[20] Esposito, John L. *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (1983), 63.
[21] *Ibid*.

of ideological underpinning. The ideology that underpins these aspirations of returning to and reviving the purity of Islam that existed in the early days of Islamic history has come to be referred to as the "Salafi" ideology. This concept, which underlies many fundamentalist movements, calls "for a return to the pristine golden age of the Prophet," the time period in which the Prophet and his immediate successors, or the salaf, lived and practiced Islam.[22] Indeed, typical accounts of modern reformist fundamentalism in the Islamic context hinge upon this existence and presence of the Salafi ideology at the core of such movements. The scholarship argues that the Salafi ideology emerged out of a sort of clash of civilizations between the West and the East – a reaction to Western domination. In the eyes of the reformists, this clash pits "the colonial, imperial, godless and morally bankrupt West" on one side against the "autochthonous moral and spiritual anchor of the Qur'an, the Hadiths and Shariah law" on the other.[23] To successfully oppose the morally bankrupt West and its influence in Muslim lands, modern fundamentalists believe that Muslims who "had gone astray from the pure, unadulterated and powerful Islam of the Umma's first generations" must once more implement Islamic foundational principles in Muslim lives and societies.[24]

Generally, the Muslim fundamentalists who take the "modernist" approach aim to provide "an Islamic alternative to the consciously imported or externally imposed sociopolitical systems during the past century and a half."[25] In the case of Muslim modernists who embrace this direction, protest and resistance to Western domination in the form of secular and/or Western sociopolitical systems takes the form of modernizing Islam itself to survive and thrive in the modern era. In particular, Muslim modernists advocate "the acceptance of borrowing modern

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[22] Rapoport, Yossef and Shahab Ahmed. *Ibn Taymiyya and His Times* (2010), 4.
[23] Brown, Jonathan A.C. *Misquoting Muhammad: The Challenge and Choices of Interpreting the Prophet's Legacy* (2015), 135.
[24] *Ibid*.
[25] *Ibid*.

knowledge from the West, but within Islamic cultural and religious frameworks."[26] Furthermore, modernists use "Islamization and progressiveness" in the quest "to revive the intellect within Islam."[27] By reviving Islamic foundations and intellect, modernists seek to "strengthen Islam in the midst of a political arena where Western powers had come to dominate a fractured Muslim world."[28] According to some scholars, Islamic modernism originates in an "intellectual stream of nineteenth-century Islamic thought" that emphasizes "a golden age in the earliest generations of Islam" while simultaneously seeking to "revive and reform Islam in its image as a bulwark against the encroachments of Western imperialist and colonialist power upon a decaying Islamic community."[29] Thus, this approach can also be categorized as "modernist Salafism," a form of Salafism that "sought to reconcile Islam with the social, political, and intellectual ideals of the Enlightenment."[30] The modernist Salafis viewed the salaf as "paragons of ingenuity and adaptability whose example would allow modern Muslims to emancipate themselves from the shackles of tradition and join the march of civilizational progress."[31]

These motivations are evident in the works of modernist Muslim thinkers who emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an era of history marked by both colonialism and imperialism: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad ʻAbduh (d. 1905), and Muhammad Rida (d. 1935). Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, a formidable Persian scholar and thinker, "worked to transform Islam into a lever against Western imperialism… to ward off foreign conquest."[32] To that end, al-Afghani emphasized the "mixture of science with intellectual

[26] AbuKhalil, Asʻad and Mahmoud Haddad. "Revival and Renewal," 2.
[27] Guidère, Mathieu. "Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalism" (2012), 226.
[28] Euben, "Enemy," 55.
[29] Euben, "Premodern," 437.
[30] Lauzière, Henri. *The Making of Salafism* (2016), 4-5.
[31] *Ibid*.
[32] Kramer, Martin. "Fundamentalist Islam at Large: The Drive for Power" (1996), 38.

development in Islamic life… to create a more prosperous and renewed Islamic society."[33] The synthesis of science, intellect, and Islam was such a priority for al-Afghani that he was known to criticize "Muslims who turned a blind eye on modern developments that Muslims needed to embrace in order to keep their independence and update their knowledge in the sciences and the arts."[34] For al-Afghani then, the modernization of Islam through scientific and technological advances was a strategic move in the opposition to Western colonial powers and hegemony.

Egyptian thinker Muhammad ʻAbduh, who maintained a close relationship with al-Afghani, also operated within the modernist paradigm. In fact, ʻAbduh is often credited with being one of the main founders of Islamic modernism.[35] According to Roxanne Euben, ʻAbduh's program of Islamic modernization was comprised of "a commitment to the revitalization of Islam in the face of European ascendance."[36] In her analysis of the works of ʻAbduh, Euben suggests that ʻAbduh's conceptualization of modernism is somewhat unique, describing it as "a complex and eclectic amalgamation of Western ideas and reinterpreted Islamic traditions."[37] This conceptualization, she theorizes, consists of "a reformulation of both Islam and modernity rather than an uncomplicated embrace of ideas and processes constitutive of… [Western] modernity."[38] Instead, ʻAbduh's thoughts on Islamic modernism represent a synthesis of Western ideas and Islamic principles, since "the use of reason of interpreting the Qur'an initiates… an indigenous path to modernity that will free Muslims from blind imitation…[of] Western models of secular society."[39]

[33] Guidère, 18.
[34] AbuKhalil, 2.
[35] Guidère, 13.
[36] Euben, "Premodern," 434.
[37] *Ibid*, 437.
[38] *Ibid*.
[39] Euben, "Premodern," 439.

These ideas influenced a great number of other scholars, including Muhammad Rashid Rida, a promoter of Islamic modernism. Rida, for instance, "stressed that Islam must return to the teachings of the ancestors, embrace consensus, and implement shura [council-based decision-making] in order to abolish the tyranny that existed throughout the Islamic world."[40] This tyranny was often regarded as the product of Western colonial and imperialist forces. Again, the modernist theme of resistance to any form of Western domination vis-à-vis the modernization of Islam itself is evident in Rida's work.

The second orientation with which modern Muslim thinkers approach the tensions that arise between modernity and Islam is the "reformist" one. In the reformist paradigm, Muslim fundamentalists are also involved in the resistance to any semblance of Western domination in Muslim lands. However, reformists argue that such domination, e.g. colonialization, was only possible because "original Islamic values had been corrupted by the worldly pursuits of the great medieval empires."[41] Thus, in order to end and prevent further Western domination, reformists propose the regeneration of Islam "by reviving the founding spirit of Islam."[42] This second direction can also be categorized in terms of its Salafi orientation, commonly identified as "Purist Salafism." Academics as well as a vast majority of self-proclaimed Salafis define Salafism as "the most authentic and purist religious orientation within Sunni Islam."[43] In their view, Salafism is "nothing other than Islam as it was first revealed, unsullied by any innovation, deviation, or accretion and uncontaminated by exogenous influences. It is the pure Islam to which the pious ancestors of the first three generations [salaf] conformed."[44]

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[40] Guidère, 302.
[41] Macdonald, Lisa. "The Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism" (2002), 2-3.
[42] *Ibid*.
[43] Lauzière, 6.
[44] Lauzière, 6.

Out of the struggle between the godless West and the ideal Islamic society, Muslim reformists like Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949), Abul Alaa al-Mawdudi (d. 1979), and Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) gained prominence as they developed and advocated for literalist and strict interpretations of Islam, interpretations that later became classified as Salafi. For example, Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1929, argued for a "renewed Qur'anic commitment to rearm Islam in the face of political paralysis and British colonial domination of Egypt."[45] In the effort to disarm Western dominance, al-Banna underscored "the necessity to remove Western influences in education and the importance of the shura (consultation) council, whose members should (according to al-Banna) have thoroughly studied religious discipline."[46] In this way, al-Banna advocated a return to the fundamentals of Islam as a crucial strategy in his quest to remove Western influences from Muslim lands. According to widespread accounts however, despite his successes related to the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Banna was unable to completely formulate and articulate his underlying reformist ideologies before he was assassinated in 1949. Thus, upon his assassination in 1949, "he left both a vital Islamic organization and what Gilles Kepel calls an 'ideological vacuum' in his wake."[47] This vacuum, however, was quickly filled by the famed Muslim fundamentalist Sayyid Qutb, who ultimately served to forge "al-Banna's legacy into a systematic ideology that would outlast the passing of his charismatic leadership."[48]

The work of Sayyid Qutb, a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, attempted to resolve the purportedly inherent tensions between Islam and modernity. In doing so, Qutb embraced the reformist method of literalist scriptural interpretation. Qutb's perspective dictates

[45] Euben, "Enemy," 55.
[46] Guidère, 119.
[47] Euben, "Enemy," 55.
[48] *Ibid*.

that the "reinterpretation of scripture to accord with the dictates of reason will destroy both the substance of and authority behind revealed truths, truths which are by definition beyond human comprehension and interpretation."[49] Thus, Qutb ranks revelation higher than reason, and consequently proposes an Islamic modernity radically distinct from and superior to Western, morally bankrupt modernity. Furthermore, the revival of Islam, according to Qutb's ideology, must be accompanied by "the recognition of the ways in which rationalist epistemology erodes divine authority, expresses and accelerates Western power and inhibits the establishment of a legitimate social system."[50] It is important to note that this view is not only reformist in nature, but also antimodernist in the sense of a more thoroughgoing rejection of fundamental dimensions of Western modernity and modernists who attempted to make a case for an Islamic version of this form of modernity. Indeed, the scholarship often discusses Qutb and his ideas in diametric opposition to those of modernist Muhammad 'Abduh. For instance, Euben contends that, in Qutb's view, the modernist arguments formed by 'Abduh "inaugurate and exemplify…the corruption that comes from Muslims being all to [sic] willing to accommodate the moral, philosophical and epistemological bankruptcy of the modern West and its drive to destroy Islamic imperatives."[51] In more general terms, Qutb's reformist and antimodernist project was premised on the "repudiation of modern, Western assumptions and arguments about the bases of political life."[52] Islamic modernists challenged the ability of the West to actualize the true aspirations and potential of modernity and emphasized the moral, intellectual, and religious resources of Islam to advance principles of freedom, science, and human equality. Reformists challenged the Eurocentric nature of these goals. Qutb was vehemently opposed to "a prior

[49] Euben, "Enemy," 448.
[50] *Ibid*.
[51] *Ibid*, 446.
[52] *Ibid*, 154.

generation of Muslim modernists who sought to render Islam as the religion of reason and, thereby, as compatible with an originally Western paradigm of modernity," an ideological position that is clearly visible in the works of Muhammad ʻAbduh, for instance.[53] Furthermore, Qutb believed that while modern Western regimes were corrupt, so were the Eastern, or Muslim, regimes that attempted to imitate them. For Qutb, political corruption of this sort constituted "a symptom of a deeper crisis, a crisis in the values of the modern world," e.g. secularism.[54] Finally, Qutb's proposed remedy to this deeper crisis that manifested in the form of Western domination hinged upon the encouragement of "the use of violence to purge Islam of Western influences."[55] This move is one that set him quite apart from preceding Muslim thinkers, including Abul Alaa al-Mawdudi whose ideas were brought to their radical conclusion by Qutb, and paved the way for Qutb to become a source of inspiration for later modern Islamists, jihadists, and other Islamic extremists.

Through his works, Abul Alaa al-Mawdudi, "an extremely influential Islamic fundamentalist whose impacts are still felt throughout the Islamic world," was able to exert a considerable amount of influence on Sayyid Qutb as well as others.[56] Indeed, al-Mawdudi is frequently credited with carrying out "much of the ideological spadework" in the formulation and articulation of a cohesive, coherent Islamic fundamentalist ideology.[57] This spadework took the form of lengthy and comprehensive theorizations of the ideal Islamic fundamentalist state, a state that would be "the very antithesis of secular Western democracy."[58] Although Sayyid Qutb "borrowed heavily" from al-Mawdudi's writings and "vision of an Islamic state," he

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[53] Euben, "Enemy," 154.
[54] Euben, "Premodern," 442-443.
[55] Guidère, 294-295.
[56] Guidère, 224.
[57] Kramer, 3.
[58] Kramer, 3.

differentiated his theories from those of al-Mawdudi, ultimately formulating unique theories that continue to influence modern Islamic fundamentalist thinkers and groups, including Ayatollah Khomeini who spearheaded the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran (at which point "Islamic fundamentalism" as a term exploded onto the academic scene).[59]

Significantly, neither the modernist trend nor the reformist trend developed in isolation of other intellectual and historical trends. Indeed, although the concept of fundamentalism was only expanded to encompass Islamic movements in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, scholarship has effectively reconfigured the conceptualization of Islamic fundamentalism to incorporate its ideological precursors, including early modern Islamic fundamentalist thinking that is differentiated by modernist and reformist orientations. Scholar John Voll contributes to this discussion in the scholarship, positing that "the global context of the last quarter of the twentieth century is in many ways specially suited for the re-emergence of the renewalist [fundamentalist] Islamic tradition."[60] Furthermore, he suggests the existence of an ideological history that is shared between post-1979 modern Islamic fundamentalist movements and pre-1979 fundamentalist movements and thinkers, claiming that the discourse engaged by both features a "utilization of tones and symbols that have deep roots within the Islamic tradition."[61] The intellectual history of Islamic fundamentalism has been traced back to the eighteenth-century revivalist movement led by Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Wahhabism, with the postulation of an "intellectual link" between "Wahhabi puritanical ideas and later Islamic thought."[62]

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[59] *Ibid*.
[60] Voll, John O. "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: *Tajdid* and *Islah*" (1983), 43.
[61] Voll, "Renewal," 43.
[62] Dallal, Ahmad. "The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850" (1993), 341.

Commonly identified as primary source of current Islamic fundamentalist thought, Wahhabi ideology incorporated aims for the socio-moral reconstruction of society "through greater adherence to monotheism and renewed attention to the Qur'an and hadith," or the fundamentals of Islam, as well as strong opposition to innovation with the Islamic tradition.[63] Because the Wahhabi followers were concerned with the "very survival of religion" in the face of innovations and other "changing conditions," they aimed to cleanse "the alien element from religious practice and thought to save the Muslim people from divine wrath."[64] These "precepts of the ultra-orthodox" Wahhabi ideology were teachings disseminated by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, including the injunction against any deviation within Islam and the related encouragement for believers to adhere only to the fundamental doctrines of the faith and practices outlined by the Prophet Muhammad.[65] Thus, the common ideological thread that is said to link Wahhabism to modern Islamic fundamentalism as outlined above is often recognized as the "Salafi" ideology, since both forms of Islamic fundamentalist thinking hinge upon the desire to return to the beliefs, institutions, and practices of the salaf, or the generations of Muslims immediately following the Prophet Muhammad himself. This common ideological thread can be expanded to include the general establishment and affirmation of the aforementioned fundamentals of Islam, which consequently leads to an expansion of the number of movements and figures that are tied together by this common thread. For example, Haar contends that "the call to affirm and implement the 'fundamentals' of the faith…is an established and recurrent theme in Islamic theological and political discourse," which can be traced from al-Ash'ari (d. 935) to Ibn

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[63] Delong-Bas, Natana J. *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (2004), 13.
[64] AbuKhalil, 2.
[65] Milton-Edwards, Beverley. "Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945: The Making of the Contemporary World" (2005), 20.

Taymiyya (d. 1328) to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1787).[66] More explicitly, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is considered to be "an important Muslim scholar from the Hanbali school of Islam who, in turn, was said to be influenced by the fundamentalist thinker, Ibn Taymiyya."[67]

The foundational principles of Wahhabi thought clearly parallel those that underpin modern Islamic fundamentalist ideology, but the true significance of such a connection emerges when the ideologies and thoughts that Wahhabism is heir to are considered. As Voll remarks, "contemporary resurgent Islam," or Islamic fundamentalism, "has deep roots in the Muslim historical experience… the contemporary activities of Islamic renewal reflect a longstanding and continuing dimension of Islamic history."[68] Identifying three main themes that may constitute this continuing dimension and appear repeatedly throughout "the major eras of Islamic history, both pre-modern and modern," Voll argues that the "long term continuity of this mode [fundamentalist] of Islam" is evident. It is worth noting that if the initial use of a concept can be effectively traced to a specific historical moment, e.g. "Islamic fundamentalism" in 1979, and if the ideological origins of this concept can then be identified as being located in the eighteenth-century, then perhaps the suggestion of a continued Islamic intellectual history related to Islamic fundamentalist that can be traced from at least the ninth century to the twenty-first century has some merit and warrants some exploration.

[66] Haar, 29.
[67] Milton-Edwards, 20.
[68] Voll, "Renewal," 32.

Chapter Four: Pre-Wahhabism Islamic Movements and Figures

In addition to their strong connection to Wahhabism, modern Islamic fundamentalists "consciously draw upon, and see themselves in a type of continuity with, pre-modern reformers" as well.[1] Given the connection felt by modern Islamic fundamentalists to Wahhabism on the one hand and pre-modern movements on the other, any identifiable ideological predecessors of Wahhabism, by extension, can be subsumed into the intellectual history of modern Islamic fundamentalism.

One ideological precursor to Wahhabism that warrants a more meticulous analysis is the Kadizadeli movement that flourished in the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire. This movement, which derives its name from the famous preacher Mehmed Kadizade (d. 1625) and its spirit from the ideas of the strict religious scholar Mehmed Birgivi (d. 1573), based its ideology on the fervent opposition to religious innovation and the espousal of a return to pure Islam.[2]

The characterization of this movement has varied greatly across different scholarly works, with the terminology utilized to describe it ranging from merely "conservative" to "fanatical." The wide array of terms used in these discussions has resulted in a disjointed and confused discourse; such use cannot facilitate a clear understanding of the essence of the Kadizadeli movement with classifications rendered meaningless through the conflation of distinct terms. However, the chaotic nature of the discourse surrounding this movement does yield interesting insights into pre-modern Islamic fundamentalism and, to some extent, religious

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[1] Voll, "Sunni," 348.
[2] El-Rouayheb, Khaled. *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb* (2015), 13.

fundamentalism as well, by illuminating the nuances that exist, albeit unrecognized in some cases, within the conceptual construction of fundamentalism.

According to Karen Armstrong, "all conservative societies looked back to a Golden Age, and for the Sunni Muslims of the Ottoman empire this was the period of the Prophet Muhammad (c. 570-632 CE) and the four Rashidun ("rightly guided) caliphs who immediately succeeded him."[3] Referring here to the Kadizadeli movement, Armstrong insinuates that the movement emerged from an inherently conservative Ottomans society, and thus, by extension, the Kadizadeli movement should also be categorized as "conservative." Similarly, Eunjeong Yi relates the "the growth of a fervent religious movement" in Ottoman society, which can also be categorized as "conservative."[4] Expanding on her characterization of the Kadizadelis as conservative and fervently religious, Yi suggests that the followers of the movement demonstrate "ultra-orthodox" and "fundamentalist" tendencies in the formation of their ideology and practices.[5] According to Yi, the Kadizadelis may be referred to as ultra-orthodox and fundamentalist, "since the upholders of its tenets posited that the ills of society could be cured by abolishing all 'innovations' and going back, at least in theory, to the simple and righteous way of life of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers."[6]

In addition to these works, a number of scholars have chosen the term "puritan" and its derivatives, e.g. "purist," to describe the Kadizadeli movement. For instance, Ottoman scholar Halil Inalcik expounds upon his "Triumph of Fanaticism" theory with a discussion on the Kadizadelis. As per Inalcik's view, the Kadizadeli movement constituted a "popular religious

[3] Armstrong, Karen. *The Battle for God: A History of Islamic Fundamentalism* (2000), 37.
[4] Yi, Eunjeong. *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage* (2004), 37.
[5] *Ibid*.
[6] *Ibid*.

fanaticism" adhered to by "Muslim puritan" followers.[7] Michael Cook has also commented on the Kadizadeli movement, declaring the movement to be a sort of "puritanical reformism" in his extensive discussion of the basic Islamic principle of commanding right and forbidding wrong.[8] In the same vein, author Dina Le Gall refers to the Kadizadelis as "puritanical" in her discussion on the rise of orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire at the expense of Sufism.[9] Le Gall, however, introduces another layer of identity-based complication to her analysis of the Kadizadelis, by describing their ideology as "militant orthodoxy."[10] This notion that the Kadizadeli movement engulfed a violent undercurrent in its ideology and practices was not confined to Le Gall's work only. Rather, scholar Khaled El-Rouayheb has also consistently described the movement as "violently puritan" and a form of "Ottoman anti-mystic purism."[11] Furthermore, he has identified this "fanatical" movement as being "militant."[12] Similarly, Simon Evstatiev has also referred to the movement as the "violently puritan Istanbul-based Qadizadeli movement."[13]

Finally, and most importantly, another descriptor frequently used in relation to the Kadizadeli movement is that of "fundamentalist," a designation which is closely tied to "Salafi." In her book investigating the Kadizadeli movement, author Madeline Zilfi refers to the movement as a "Vaizan-led [preacher-led] fundamentalist movement."[14] According to Zilfi, "Kadizade puritanism" was built upon a "fundamentalist ethic," or a "set of doctrinal positions intended to rid Islam of beliefs and practices that had accumulated since the era of the Prophet Muhammad's Medina."[15] Marinos Sariyannis also designates the Kadizadeli movement as a

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[7] Inalcik, Halil. "The Triumph of Fanaticism" (1973), 183.
[8] Cook, Michael. *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (2001), 328.
[9] Le Gall, Dina. *A Culture of Sufism: Naqshbandis in the Ottoman World*, *1450-1700* (2005), 112.
[10] Le Gall, 150.
[11] El-Rouayheb, 13, 191.
[12] *Ibid*, 175.
[13] Evstatiev, Simon. "The Qadizadeli Movement and the Revival of *takfir* in the Ottoman Age" (2015), 211.
[14] Zilfi, Madeline. *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)* (1988), 38.
[15] Zilfi, Madeline. "The Kadizadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul" (1986), 252-253.

"fundamentalist movement," the main characteristics of which were a desire to emulate the way of life present in the time of the Prophet and a "violent struggle against the dervish [Sufi] brotherhoods."[16] Additionally, scholar Jonathan Brown describes the Kadizadeli movement as "a conservative fundamentalist movement" that grew out of an acute sense that Muslims had abandoned or adulterated the message of Islam."[17] Brown's analysis, however, also ties the fundamentalist Kadizadeli movement to Salafi thought by describing the source of the Kadizadelis' ideological inspiration, Mehmed Birgivi, as a "proto-Salafi" and "Ottoman iconoclast."[18] This connection drawn between the Kadizadelis and Salafism is not only pointed out by Brown, but also by Cemal Kafadar. According to Kafadar, the "ultra-orthodox" Kadizadeli movement was a "selefi [Salafi] movement" that vehemently opposed the recognition of innovations in religion as acceptable customs.[19] In a doctoral dissertation that presents a monographic work on the Kadizadeli movement, Semiramis Cavusoglu builds upon Kafadar's analysis of the Kadizadeli movement as a Salafi movement. Not only does Cavusoglu argue that the Kadizadeli ideology can be traced back to Salafi thought, he also contends that the Kadizadelis should actually be considered "heirs" of the Salafis.[20] He further claims that intellectually, "the Kadizadelis followed the path of such selefis [Salafis] as Ibn Hanbel [Ibn Hanbal] (d. 855) [and] Ibn Teymiye [Ibn Taymiyya] (d. 1328).[21]

The fact that these numerous analyses of the Kadizadelis simultaneously characterize the Kadizadeli movement in a multitude of ways illustrates two key points. One, the broad range of terms utilized in the aforementioned discussions highlights the confusion that underlies the

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[16] Sariyannis, Marinos. *The Kadizadeli Movement as a Social and Political Phenomenon: The Rise of a 'Mercantile Ethic'?* (2012), 263.
[17] Brown, 64.
[18] *Ibid*, 168.
[19] Kafadar, Cemal. "Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels Without a Cause?" (2007), 120, 126.
[20] Cavusoglu, Semiramis. "The Kadizadeli Movement: An Attempt of Seri'at-Minded Reform on the Ottoman Empire" (PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1990), 39-40.
[21] Cavusoglu, 42.

scholarship related to the Kadizadelis. Two, the types of characteristics that are associated with the Kadizadeli movement seem to be almost unconsciously equated by scholars with fundamentalist movements more generally. Because the Kadizadeli movement has been widely identified as a fundamentalist movement, many of the other characteristics associated with the movement can be considered as indicators or markers of general fundamentalism in the Islamic context. These characterizations appear to include "conservative," "ultra-orthodox," "fervent" religiosity, "violent" and "militant," "puritanical," "reformist," fanatical, and "Salafi." Thus, despite the chaos of the scholarship related to the identification of the essence of the Kadizadeli movement, the scholarship signals the existence of subtle nuances in the conceptual construction of "Islamic fundamentalism."

As a case study of pre-modern Islamic fundamentalism, the Kadizadeli ideology and its underlying motivations must be identified and examined. At the onset of any analysis of the Kadizadeli movement, the Ottoman preacher Mehmed Kadizade is identified as the founder of the movement as well as its namesake. The sermons of Kadizade, who began to "promulgate a kind of 'fundamentalist ethic'" as previously discussed, were said to have "infused new life into the centuries-old dialectic between innovation and fundamental, 'orthodox,' Islam."[22] Mehmed Kadizade, in turn, was quite clearly influenced by Mehmed Birgivi, a sixteenth-century Ottoman scholar considered to be "the founding father of Ottoman fundamentalism" by Zilfi.[23] Zilfi has further described Birgivi as the "renowned fundamentalist theologian" who authored "Treatise" ("Risale-i Birgili Mehmed"), a work that "attempted to eliminate ambiguities of faith or belief by providing the community with a catechism of fundamentals in simple prose."[24] His "Treatise" ultimately became the textual basis of the Kadizadeli movement as the "most widely read,

[22] Zilfi, "The Kadizadelis," 253.
[23] Zilfi, "The Politics of Piety," 144.
[24] Zilfi, "The Politics of Piety," 144.

quoted and followed 'Kadizadeli' tract."[25] According to Cook, the works and ideologies propagated by Mehmed Birgivi were based partially on the Islamic principle of commanding right and forbidding wrong. Within Birgivi's work, this principle manifested as the notion that "one may proceed [in forbidding wrong] even where this will lead to certain death; one thereby enters the ranks of the most excellent of martyrs."[26] The conceptual use of martyrdom within an ideological framework constitutes a significant motivation for followers to engage in the practices required by such an ideology. The promise of martyrdom may have thus resulted in Birgivi becoming "the inspiration of the Qadizadeli movement," or at the very least, played a role in the development of Kadizadeli ideology specifically.[27] It is important to note that the touting of martyrdom's merits is also an underlying motivation for fundamentalists more generally.

From the teachings and preachings of Mehmed Birgivi and Mehmed Kadizade, the Kadizadeli movement formed and developed its ideology. In his doctoral dissertation on Islamic orthodoxy among the Ottomans, Necati Ozturk presents the Kadizadelis as being compelled by the "urge to return to the primitive purity of Islam."[28] Thus, the movement preached "a return to a fundamentalist version of the religion, purified of such accretions and distortions as it was felt to have undergone."[29] Evstatiev raises a similar argument when he describes the Kadizadelis' movement as a "struggle for a sharia-minded reform brought about through reviving the beliefs and practices of the first Muslim generation in the first/seventh century."[30] In his examination of Islam in the Ottoman Empire, Ahmet Ocak argues that Mehmed Birgivi and his followers,

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[25] *Ibid*.
[26] Cook, "Commanding Right," 324.
[27] Cook, 328.
[28] Ozturk, Necati. "Islamic Orthodoxy among the Ottomans in the 17th Century with Special Reference to the Qadizade Movement" (1981), 161.
[29] Ozturk, "Islamic Orthodoxy," 162.
[30] Evstatiev, "The Qadizadeli Movement," 212.

namely the Kadizadelis, "violently opposed aspects of folk Islam in the Ottoman Empire," choosing instead to implement and "conform strictly to scriptural foundations and to cleanse it [Islam] of superstition and primitive beliefs [religious innovations]."[31]

In parallel, Cavusoglu broaches the subject of Kadizadeli ideology by relating its "stated purpose of restoring the purity of the Islam extant during the time of the Prophet and the Four Righteous Caliphs."[32] He argues that this restoration could only be achieved by "rejecting all religious practices which had emerged in subsequent periods as bid'ats (innovations), and by targeting the activities of the Sufis, the most obvious bearers of these bid'ats in seventeenth-century Ottoman society."[33] This categorization of the Kadizadeli movement as one that looked back to an age of purer Islam and sought to eradicate any sort of religious innovations from the tradition is also presented by Le Gall. She contends that the Kadizadeli rhetoric "called for the imposition of a strictly defined orthodoxy."[34] According to Le Gall, Kadizadeli orthodoxy entailed the denunciation of innovations throughout society by removing "the use of music and dance in the Sufi ritual to supererogatory prayers performed in congregation, [and] visits to saints' tombs in search of intercession."[35] Sariyannis appears to be in agreement with Le Gall's characterization of the Kadizadeli movement as being diametrically opposed to Sufism, as he argues that the main characteristics of the movement's ideology "were opposition to any innovation (bid'at), as opposed to the way of life in the time of the Prophet Muhammad, and especially a violent struggle against the dervish brotherhoods."[36] According to Sariyannis, this ideology manifested itself as a struggle against "what they [the Kadizadelis] perceived as the

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[31] Ocak, Ahmet Yasar. "Islam in the Ottoman Empire: A Sociological Framework for a New Interpretation" (2003), 195.
[32] Cavusoglu, 1.
[33] *Ibid*.
[34] Le Gall, "A Culture of Sufism," 151.
[35] Le Gall, "A Culture of Sufism," 151.
[36] Sariyannis, "The Kadizadeli Movement," 263.

corruption of society and the state due to irreligious innovations and especially the dervish orders."[37] Finally, this view is also shared by scholar Derin Terzioglu, whose work is related to the conceptualization of Ottoman sunnitization. Terzioglu describes the Kadizadelis as finding "fault…with many Sufis (including adamantly shariah-abiding, "sunnitizing" ones) for their perceivedly lax applications of the shariah [Islamic law] and deviations from the Sunna."[38] Thus, from the scholarship cited above, it is evident that much of the literature presents Kadizadeli ideology in terms of two diametrically opposed factions, the Kadizadelis and the Sufis.

As a natural extension of being framed in opposition to Sufism, the Kadizadeli movement has also been characterized as a strain of Islamic orthodoxy. In her scholarship on Islamic conversions in the early modern Ottoman Empire, Tijana Krstic comments on what she calls the "process of confessional polarization and Sunnitization."[39] She argues that this process of Ottoman orthodoxization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was "spearheaded by the so-called Kadizadelis – a group of 'puritan' preachers whose agitation and calls to religious and moral reform of the empire shook the Ottoman capital."[40] The notion that the Kadizadelis were a crucial mechanism through which the orthodoxization and Sunnitization of Ottoman subjects occurred is also seen in the works of Ozturk and Zilfi. In the case of Ozturk's scholarship, Ozturk posits that the Kadizadelis "should be viewed and evaluated" in the context of Muslims who "saw themselves as the real representatives of Islamic orthodoxy" in a society plagued by religious innovations and impurity.[41] Finally, Zilfi herself contends that during the seventeenth century, "Istanbul's pulpits were shaken by denunciations of Ottoman religious leaders and of

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[37] *Ibid*, 265.
[38] Terzioglu, Derin. "How to Conceptualizae Ottoman Sunnitization: A Historiographical Discussion" (2012), 319.
[39] Krstic, Tijana. "Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire" (2011), 13.
[40] *Ibid*.
[41] Ozturk, "Islamic Orthodoxy," 409-410.

the pliant bounds of orthodoxy," denunciations that stemmed from Kadizadeli frustrations with the status quo.[42] Furthermore, Zilfi categorizes the Kadizadeli movement as part of the "holy law-defined 'orthodoxy'" within the Ottoman Empire.[43] Through this examination of the scholarship related to the orthodox status of the Kadizadeli movement, it is apparent that the movement not only aided in the Ottoman orthodoxization process, whether intentionally or not, but also was built upon the desire to reinstitute pristine, orthodox Islam within society more broadly.

Part of this desire to elevate its own understanding of proper Islamic orthodoxy stems from the Kadizadeli movement's ideological connections to the Hanbali school of thought. Through Mehmed Birgivi, the Kadizadeli ideology, like Wahhabism, has also been situated within the Hanbali school of thought. As Halil Inalcik explains, Mehmed Birgivi and his followers "adopted the strict traditionalism of the hanbalites" and "regarded as contrary to Islam any innovation which an objective interpretation of the Koran and the sunna could not admit."[44] This analysis indicates a connection between Wahhabi, Kadizadeli, and Hanbali ideology. The Kadizadelis, in particular, are described by Inalcik as essentially a "class of fanatical ulema [Islamic scholars]" that "condemned all practices introduced since the time of the Prophet as 'innovation'… [and] railed against the injustices and lax morals of the age."[45] These tenets are remarkably similar to the foundational principles of Wahhabism outlined above, and scholar James Currie expounds on the similarities at length in his piece, "Kadizadeli Ottoman Scholarship, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and the Rise of the Saudi State." Marking the similarities as "striking," Currie argues that the Wahhabi and Kadizadeli movements share

[42] Zilfi, "The Kadizadelis," 251.
[43] *Ibid*.
[44] Inalcik, "The Triumph of Fanaticism," 185.
[45] Inalcik, "The Triumph of Fanaticism," 182 – 184.

several defining features: "opposition to religious innovations, in particular against loud dhikr [remembrance] in groups, the dancing rituals of certain Sufis, and innovated grave visits, chiefly the practice of asking dead saints for their intercession at graves."[46] What is even more noteworthy is that not only do both the Wahhabi and Kadizadeli movements display the characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism discussed above, particularly the idealization of the Prophet's time and the notion that religious innovations have tarnished the fundamentals of the religion, but they are also associated with Hanbali thought.

The inspiration for the Kadizadeli ideology, in turn, is often traced through Mehmed Kadizade and Mehmed Birgivi to Ibn Taymiyya, the infamous fourteenth-century Hanbali scholar (who belongs to the same school of jurisprudence as Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab). This association has been noted by several works that claim that "the Kadizadelis were indeed influenced by… the radical fourteenth-century Hanbali thinker Ibn Taymiyya… particularly [in] their condemnation of the veneration of shrines and saints and their ideas about governance in accordance with religious law."[47] In even more concrete terms, Currie contends that "it is clear that the Kadizadeli scholars and the teachers of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab were part of a large network of scholars who admired Ibn Taymiyya," designating Ibn Taymiyya as the "common source of reference."[48] These contentions are heavily reliant on the principles embraced by Ibn Taymiyya, a scholar who has been described as "an uncompromising enemy of any deviation from the way of the Sunna [the Prophet's practices], a rigid purist who refused to accept any form of innovation."[49] In his teachings and writings, Ibn Taymiyya propagated the

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[46] Currie, James M.D. "Kadizadeli Ottoman Scholarship, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, and the Rise of the Saudi State" (2015), 265.

[47] El-Rouayheb, "Islamic Intellectual History," 192.

[48] Currie, "Kadizadeli Ottoman Scholarship," 287.

[49] Rapoport, "Ibn Taymiyya," 13.

position that "the closer one is to the original Prophetic message, the closer one gets to the truth," by adhering to the practices and beliefs of the Prophet and his immediate successors and "peeling off the obscuring layers of interpretation added on in later centuries."[50] The analysis of Ibn Taymiyya's life and teachings reveals the presence of the same foundational principles that underpin modern Islamic fundamentalism, Salafism, Wahhabism, and the Kadizadeli movement.

An immensely influential scholar, Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya was born in 1263 C.E. (661 A.H.) in Harran, "a small town in northern Mesopotamia, near Urfa" (the southeastern part of modern Turkey).[51] At the young age of five years old, however, Ibn Taymiyya and his entire family left Harran and migrated to Damascus as a result of the Mongol invasions occurring in the region at that time.[52] Eventually, Ibn Taymiyya would become closely associated with the reputation of his family's new hometown of Damascus, to the extent that he is often identified primarily as a Damascene scholar.

In Damascus, Ibn Taymiyya's "prominent Hanbali family" was able to integrate into the predominantly Hanbali institutions of the city.[53] His father ʻAbd al-Halim, "a scholar of Hadith who faithfully followed the tradition of the Hanbalis," took up a teaching post at a local school, al-Sukariyyah School, a post that Ibn Taymiyya himself would later receive as a young man.[54] Following in the footsteps of his family's prominent scholars (including his father and grandfather), Ibn Taymiyya himself quickly attained a comprehensive education in the Islamic scholarly sciences, including jurisprudence, hadith science, and history.[55] According to scholar Abdul Hakim Al-Matroudi, who extensively analyzes the relationship between the Hanbali

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[50] Rapoport, "Ibn Taymiyya," 11.
[51] Madjid, Nurcolish. "Ibn Taymiyya on *Kalam* and Falsafa" (1984), 44.
[52] *Ibid*.
[53] *Ibid*, 45.
[54] *Ibid*.
[55] Al-Matroudi, Abdul Hakim. "The Hanbali School of Law and Ibn Taymiyyah" (2006), 16.

school of law and Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Taymiyya received his education from “a large number of sheikhs,” with some sources identifying that number as more than two hundred.[56] There was great variance of school and doctrinal affiliations among the scholars under which Ibn Taymiyya studied, and for Al-Matroudi, the breadth of these scholarly opinions accounts for the noticeable influence of non-Hanbali jurisprudential doctrines on Ibn Taymiyya’s personal ideology.[57] Al-Matroudi is not the only scholar to have made this observation related to Ibn Taymiyya’s intellectual profile. Joseph N. Bell takes a similar position, arguing that “Ibn Taymiyya’s intellectual horizons were broader than was customary for the members of his school,” because he was also familiar with “speculative theology [*kalam*], philosophy [*falsafa*], mysticism, and heresiography.”[58] Ultimately, the considerable breadth of Ibn Taymiyya’s intellectual profile would become his greatest asset as well as his critical flaw, at least in the eyes of his contemporaries.

For some scholars, a direct cause of Ibn Taymiyya’s uniquely broad intellectual base was the historical context in which he was raised. As per Al-Matroudi’s characterization, “Ibn Taymiyyah lived in a period of extremes” that was marked by the development of “a tradition of knowledge” as well as the “devastation and terror of the Mongol invasions and occupation.”[59] Because of his experience with the “dangerousness” of the Mongol invaders from the time of his childhood onwards,[60] Ibn Taymiyya was convinced not only that “the religious leaders, particularly the ulama [scholars], did not live up to their duties as guardians of the faith and the guides of the masses,” but also that they were “responsible for all of the calamities which befell

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[56] *Ibid*.
[57] *Ibid*.
[58] Bell, Joseph N. “Love Theory in Later Hanbalite Islam” (1979), 46.
[59] Al-Matroudi, 16.
[60] Michot, Yahya. “Muslims Under Non-Muslim Rule” (2006), 50.

the community," including the Mongol invasions.[61] Through his work and scholarship, Ibn Taymiyya set out to remedy this seemingly dire situation by advocating a reformist position that called for a return to the basics of "pristine" Islam. According to the dissertation written by Nurcolish Madjid, Ibn Taymiyya was a reformist with the express aim "to liberate the Muslims" and "make them aware of the simple but valid, effective, and original concepts of Islam."[62] Madjid's contention also finds support in the work of Karen Armstrong, who declares Ibn Taymiyya's eventual adoption of this reformist role to have been inevitable. She argues that "reform movements usually occur… in the wake of a great political disaster" such as the "trauma" of the Mongol invasions, and thus, Ibn Taymiyya's enthusiastic support for and extensive involvement in a type of reformist movement that declared the earlier stages of Islam to be pure and pristine is foreseeable.[63]

In line with his reformist aspirations, Ibn Taymiyya "wanted to bring the Shariah up to date so that it could meet the real needs of Muslims in these drastically altered circumstances" (as created in the aftermath of the Mongol invasions).[64] To that end, he developed a "program of reformation" that was designed to "purify and, simultaneously, to rejuvenate Islam."[65] In the opinion of scholar Fazlur Rahman, however, this assessment of Ibn Taymiyya's aims can be taken one step further. Rahman contends that there is "no doubt" that, in conjunction with the desire to purify Islam, Ibn Taymiyya's reformist agenda was unpinned by the aim "to rediscover and intellectually reconstitute the early normative community of Islam which was based on the teaching of the Qur'an and the Sunna."[66] To that end, according to Rahman, Ibn Taymiyya "saw

[61] Madjid, 42.
[62] *Ibid*, 53.
[63] Armstrong, Karen. "The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism" (2000), 40.
[64] Armstrong, 40.
[65] Madjid, 62.
[66] Rahman, Fazlur. "Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study of Islamic Fundamentalism" (2000), 132.

it as his task to ‘put things right’ and reorient the Muslim Community (*umma*) in the proper direction,” because the Muslims had lost their way as evidenced through a number of contemporary practices, but particularly through speculative theology (*kalam*) and philosophy (*falsafa*). Indeed, Madjid would argue that his “vigorous refutation of *kalam* and *falsafa* was meant to clean out the religious thought-system, to return Islam to its original, simple pristine nobility.”[67] For Ibn Taymiyya, the fulfillment of his reformist agenda, which included the elimination of any accretions to pure Islam, would result in the “purification and revitalization” of Islam through which calamities like the Mongol invasions could be prevented.[68]

The notion that a purification and revitalization of Islam was both necessary and desirable was not a novel concept engineered by Ibn Taymiyya. Rather, this notion originated in the traditionalist Hanbali school of thought, which advocated “the strict adherence to the teachings of the Qur’an, the Sunna of the Prophet and the Consensus (*ijma’*) mainly of the first generations of scholars.”[69] Referred to as “ultra-conservatives” and “extreme literalists,” the Hanbalis were characterized by their “emphatic traditionalism,” which in turn was marked by a “strongly literal understanding of the scriptural texts.”[70] As a result of their strong traditionalist views, the Hanbalis were sensitive to “any form of religious rationalism” and thus, were vehemently “opposed to virtually every Islamic faction, particularly those with rationalistic inclinations,” like the speculative theologians and the philosophers.[71] Indeed, the founder of the school, Ibn Hanbal (d. 855), preached that the Qur’an was the uncreated Word of God and that only the salaf, the pious ancestors, were worthy of emulation.[72] Ultimately, Hanbali teachings

[67] Madjid, 231.
[68] *Ibid*.
[69] Abrahamov, Binyamin. “Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism” (1998), 1.
[70] Madjid, 32.
[71] Madjid, 31-33.
[72] Madjid, 31-33.

and ideologies arguably "produced the Wahhabi fundamentalist movement," the aforementioned "puritanical monotheistic rigorism" that "considered contemporary religious practices polytheistic corruptions of the pristine Islam they sought to revive."[73]

The Hanbali school has been characterized as "the medieval archetype of Islamic scriptural fundamentalism," and Ibn Taymiyya has been firmly situated within this archetype as the scholar who "produced the most forceful statement of medieval Hanbalite fundamentalism."[74] With the Hanbalis' fervent espousal of these fundamental tenets and precepts, it comes as no surprise that Ibn Taymiyya aligned himself quite closely with the Hanbali school of thought. In fact, as evidenced by his reformist aims of purification and revitalization, Ibn Taymiyya may also be characterized as an "adamant literalist," because in his view, "Islamic religion is only what God and His Prophet have ordained, with examples of implementation in the Traditions."[75] Ibn Taymiyya's literalist and traditionalist views, however, are foundationally underpinned by his ideas related to consensus in the Islamic tradition. While he accepts the notion and importance of achieving consensus in the Islamic tradition and scholarship, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the most "well established" consensus is that "of the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-salih)," or the first three generations of Muslims who either lived during the life of the Prophet Muhammad (S.) or immediately afterwards.[76] However, some would argue that his feelings towards consensus were less ambivalent and that he actually rejected the widely acknowledged conception of consensus as a "legitimate source of religious authority."[77] Instead, according to these voices, Ibn Taymiyya insisted that "the only binding ijma' [consensus] was

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[73] *Ibid*.

[74] Arjoman, Said Amir. "Unity and Diversity in Islamic Fundamentalism" (1995), 180.

[75] *Ibid*, 229-230.

[76] Abrahamov, 71, note 39.

[77] Madjid, 54.

that which had been done by the first three generations of Muslims – the Salaf," based on his argument that only these generations had been mentioned by God in the Qur'an as deserving of paradise.[78] In either account, Ibn Taymiyya's perceptions of the importance and inviolable legitimacy of the Salaf are clear, and this formulation of their authority in Islamic scholarship forms the foundation for several of his views, such as his opinion on innovation.

For Ibn Taymiyya, the Salaf undeniably represents a pristine, authentic, and definitively accurate version of practiced Islam. Thus, any novel practices, ideas, and concepts that emerge after the first three generations can be considered to be innovations and accretions in Ibn Taymiyya's view, or *bid'a*. According to Madjid, after determining the fundamental elements of Islam, namely the Qur'an and Sunna, Ibn Taymiyya condemned "whatever beliefs and practices existed outside the scriptural framework as illegitimate innovations," labeling them as *bid'a*.[79] Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya believed that the most frequent cause of such innovation was "free rational interference in religious principles."[80] For example, Ibn Taymiyya strongly condemned the practice of speculative theology, or *kalam*, as an innovation, due the field's heavy borrowing of Hellenistic philosophical elements that were external to the Qur'an and the Sunna.[81] Similarly, he saw philosophy itself as a "harmful innovation," a "heresy" even, that needed to be "condemned even more than *kalam*."[82] Evidently, because he sought to excise these innovations and accretions, Ibn Taymiyya ultimately "overturned much of the medieval jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and philosophy that had come to be considered sacred, in a desire to return to the original Muslim archetype."[83] So deeply traditionalist and literalist was Ibn Taymiyya's position that he

[78] *Ibid*.
[79] Madjid, 53.
[80] *Ibid*, 229-230.
[81] *Ibid*, 126.
[82] *Ibid,* 150-151.
[83] Armstrong, 41.

easily, and perhaps thoughtlessly, dismissed any sort of innovation and accretion that he deemed as either in opposition or external to the practices of the Salaf, regardless of importance or significance to Islamic scholarship.

Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of the Salaf and *bid'a* greatly contributed to the development of his reformist program and general ideological views, such as his stance on *kalam* and philosophy, reason and revelation, and *ta'wil* (metaphorical interpretation). In relation to *kalam*, the practice of speculative theology developed by the Mu'tazilites and later adopted by the Ash'arites, Ibn Taymiyya was a strong opponent of the field. Indeed, according to Madjid, he rejected all *kalam* arguments, "by insisting that such methods of proof were never used by any prophet of God, and by claiming that such methods were unknown to the Salaf," a position that is entirely aligned with his literalist, Salafi views.[84] Furthermore, scholar M. Sait Ozervarli has suggested that as Ibn Taymiyya rejected *kalam*-based reasoning, he actually "tried to construct an alternative rational theology based on the revealed sources and the traditions of the salaf," a suggestion that has gained traction since.[85]

Although Ibn Taymiyya's deep opposition to the *kalam* field is indisputable, a more nuanced treatment of his interactions with *kalam* is found in the dissertation of Carl El-Tobgui, which explores the role of reason and revelation in Ibn Taymiyya's work in depth. In El-Tobgui's view, Ibn Taymiyya did not entirely discount the value of *kalam* – that is, the merit of "disciplined reasoning about theological matters."[86] Instead, Ibn Taymiyya "distinguished between a '*kalam* sunni'… and a '*kalam* bid'i,'" or in other words, "between an orthodox and a heterodox way of reasoning about religious truths."[87] This understanding of Ibn Taymiyya's

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[84] Madjid, 129.
[85] Ozervarli, 89.
[86] El-Tobgui, Carl. "Reason, Revelation, and the Reconstitution of Rationality" (2013), 94-95.
[87] El-Tobgui, 94-95.

methodology constitutes a more accurate stance in the scholarship, which is often comprised of either the position that Ibn Taymiyya rejected *kalam* and all of its components entirely or the position that he embraced its methods.

While his views on *kalam* may be somewhat complicated, Ibn Taymiyya's stance against philosophy is both clear and quite intense. Indeed, some scholars have argued that he is "the most prolific theologian in refuting philosophy," and although his status as the most prolific may be debatable, there is a general consensus that Ibn Taymiyya's critiques of Greek philosophy and logical elements is one of the strongest ever leveled.[88] Madjid discusses Ibn Taymiyya's opposition to philosophy at length, eventually focusing in on what he claims is Ibn Taymiyya's main criticism of the philosophers. For Ibn Taymiyya, the fundamental issue with the philosopher's worldview is that it renders an understanding of God that "reduces Him to an impersonal and rational category devoid of any capability of becoming the source of morals and an ethical way of life."[89] Here, the aforementioned description of the "clash of civilizations" as existing between the godless and morally bankrupt West and the traditions of Islam seems relevant. Even as early as the fourteenth century, traces of such a clash, or at the very least, tension, can be observed between the rationalizing philosophical traditions of the West and the spiritual development of morals and ethics embraced by Islam.[90]

Much of Ibn Taymiyya's opposition to philosophy is illustrated in his grappling with the legacy of the great al-Ghazali, the medieval Islamic scholar who penned the famous "Tahafut al-Falasifa" (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). Although al-Ghazali eventually worked to oppose and undermine the work of the philosophers during his time, scholars have argued that he

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[88] Abrahamov, 65, note 5.
[89] Madjid, 158-159.
[90] This tension between Western philosophy and religious traditions is not unique to Islam. Instead, such contentions have existed "between the impassionate God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the dispassionate unmoved Mover of the philosophers" as well.

"nonetheless embraced with enthusiasm the Aristotelian logic built on definition and syllogism that forms the very core of the system."[91] It is precisely this acceptance and espousal of Aristotelian logic that offended Ibn Taymiyya's sensibilities, since Ibn Taymiyya considered such Hellenistic philosophical tools to be unacceptable innovations. Additionally, Ibn Taymiyya accused al-Ghazali of "oscillating between philosophy and Islam," saying that "whereas in his Tahafut, he accuses the philosophers of infidelity, he follows them completely elsewhere in his discussions of prophecy."[92] With this allegation, Ibn Taymiyya's treatment of al-Ghazali as a misguided, and at times hypocritical, Islamic scholar is clear.

Furthermore, the philosophic contemplation of God leads to the problematic "identity of the world and God and so to the absolute inanity both of God and man."[93] A related issue, at least in the view of Ibn Taymiyya, is the mystical, Sufi doctrine of the Unity of the Being, or "*wihdat al-wujūd*," developed by Ibn Al-'Arabi.[94] While he was not completely opposed to the practice of modern mysticism, Ibn Taymiyya was indeed "strongly opposed to the existential monism of Ibn al-'Arabi and his followers," a notion captured entirely by the "Unity of the Being" concept.[95] Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya appreciated the general role of spirituality in the practice of religion, but maintained that the system and concepts, including the "prevalence of superstitions and fatalism,"[96] endorsed by Sufism in its entirety were worthy of rejection.[97] Both of these conclusions, that is the philosophers' rendering of an impersonal, rational God and the mystics' concept of the Unity of the Being, are problematic for Ibn Taymiyya because they are in contradiction to his literalist understanding and reading of the Qur'an and Sunna. Similarly,

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91 El-Tobgui, 66.
92 Rahman, Fazlur. "Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy" (1958), 104.
93 *Ibid*, 101.
94 *Ibid*, 105.
95 Bell, 46.
96 Madjid, 53
97 Rahman, "Prophecy," 92.

the Kadizadelis, as previously discussed, also took stances in opposition to certain heterodox Sufi practices. Besides constituting a contradiction, these conclusions also suggest goals of human life that are incompatible with Ibn Taymiyya's view that the goal of human life is actually to engage in *'ibada*, or worship, and acknowledge God's will and fearlessly implement it in life.[98]

Ibn Taymiyya's opposition to both speculative theology and philosophy is closely related to his views on the role of reason and revelation in religious understanding. His general view on the relationship between reason and revelation was that revelation always trumped reason. He considered the Qur'an and Sunna to be "prime and infallible" authorities, and there was no allowance for "reason (*'aql*), personal opinion (*ra'y*), or analogical arguments (*qiyas*)" to oppose or correct the Qur'an.[99] In other words, Ibn Taymiyya rejected even the possibility of "conflict between reason and revealed knowledge, primarily because human knowledge could not contradict the absolute truth of divine revelation."[100] Rather, he argued, speculation was an inherently weak tool that led to the "dangerous consequences" of a variance of rationalities and self-contradictions, lending support to his claim that "reason is an unstable device, while tradition is stable and does not change."[101] Then instead of favoring reason over revelation, Ibn Taymiyya actually proposed the institution of a "rationality based on revelation and tradition."[102] He based this proposition on the stance that there "can be no antagonism between faith and intellect," because intellect itself can stem from faith as well as rationales and proofs found in revelation.[103] From this discussion, Ibn Taymiyya's essential issue with speculative theology and

[98] Rahman, "Prophecy," 92.
[99] Bell, 55.
[100] Ozervarli, 84.
[101] Abrahamov, 21-23.
[102] Ozervarli, 84.
[103] Madjid, 56.

philosophy becomes evident, since both disciplines, in his view, prioritized human reason over revealed knowledge in an array of circumstances, particularly through the use of ta'wil (metaphorical interpretation).

The use of ta'wil presents an apt illustration of several of the issues outlined above, including *kalam* and philosophy as well as reason and revelation. Ta'wil, or "the rationalists' figurative interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna," was a practice that Ibn Taymiyya was vehemently opposed to. The speculative theologians and philosophers made extensive use of the tool in order to replace the "common meaning of a word for a less common one… when the primary meaning raises difficulties" in terms of human reasoning.[104] Essentially, ta'wil was employed to provide metaphorical interpretations for portions of revelation that created inconsistencies within the revelation, such as the nature of God's attributes, or led to tensions with human rationality, especially when the literal meanings of some texts proved to be unacceptable to reason.[105] As previously mentioned, Ibn Taymiyya held that revelation trumped reason, and so this use of ta'wil went against his fundamentally traditionalist and literalist standpoint. Thus, he refuted the practice with a variety of arguments. One argument he employed was related to the Salaf. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the use of ta'wil by the speculative theologians and philosophers was a result of their misinterpretation of the term "ta'wil" itself. He argued that the original understanding, as developed by the Salaf and early exegetes, considered ta'wil to be "explaining the text and clarifying its meaning…, aiming merely at better understanding," and so the shift in usage was "not the true meaning of ta'wil."[106] Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya contended that the categorization of revealed text as either literal or allegorical was an innovation carried out after the time of the Salaf, since neither the Salaf nor other

[104] Ozervarli, 88.
[105] Madjid, 6.
[106] Ozervarli, 88.

prominent scholars ever referred to these categories.[107] Finally, Ibn Taymiyya also argued that ta'wil "does violence to the language of revelation and, no less significantly, stands in diametric opposition" to the position of the Salaf.[108]

An influential and prolific scholar, Ibn Taymiyya has had an incredibly significant impact on the subsequent development of Islamic tradition, scholarship, and later movements, most notably Islamic fundamentalism. Although his legacy for later generations is indisputable, the reception of his work and ideas by his contemporaries presents a more complicated issue. For instance, Al-Matroudi has argued that "Ibn Taymiyyah commanded a very large number of followers from all sections of society including scholars, members of the lay public and even political leaders."[109] According to El-Tobgui, however, Ibn Taymiyya was "by no means welcomed with open arms even by the majority of his own fellow Hanbalis," sometimes because of the supposedly disproportionate role he "accorded reason in understanding and interpreting revealed truths" and other times because of his "idiosyncratic legal opinions in which … he broke ranks with accepted Hanbali doctrine and practice."[110] This position, that Ibn Taymiyya was not always aligned with the views and rulings of his personal school of thought, is supported by other scholars as well, who argue that "he often went against the dominant Hanbali position of his time, following his own ijtihad."[111]

Despite the complex nature of the reception he received from his contemporaries, the legacy Ibn Taymiyya left for later generations has proven to be quite remarkable and influential. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya has been hailed as the "architect of Salafism, the concept espoused by

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[107] Madjid, 85.
[108] El-Tobgui, 303.
[109] Al-Matroudi, 129.
[110] El-Tobgui, 99.
[111] Ozervarli, 80.

revivalist movements calling for a return to the pristine golden age of the Prophet."[112] In particular, Ibn Taymiyya's influence can be traced directly to the Kadizadeli movement in the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth-century Arabian Peninsula, and the neo-Salafist tradition in the last century. While both the Kadizadeli and Wahhabi movements have been independently connected to Ibn Taymiyya, they have also been situated into "a larger network of scholars who admired Ibn Taymiyya," thereby designating Ibn Taymiyya as the "common source of reference" for both of these movements as well as others.[113] Significantly, this network of scholars includes several scholars from the last century who affected the rise of neo-Salafist movements. This group of neo-Salafi scholars is comprised of both modernist Salafis, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Muhammad Rida, and purist Salafis, such as Hasan al-Banna, Abul Alaa al-Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb. In their respective works, the influence of Ibn Taymiyya and his literalist, traditionalist views bound in the framework of Salafi excellence is clear.[114]

In the words of Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, "today, few figures from the medieval Islamic period can claim such a hold on modern Islamic discourses" as can Ibn Taymiyya.[115]As a reformer, Ibn Taymiyya provided inspiration to the following generations of Muslims, even "some of the Muslim fundamentalists of our own day" who are working in the tradition of reform and revival.[116] Indeed, not only did Ibn Taymiyya provide a source of inspiration for such movements, but his works and ideas served to shape them in ways he may have never imagined.

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[112] Rapoport, Yossef, and Shahab Ahmed. "Ibn Taymiyya and His Times" (2010), 4.
[113] *Ibid*, 287.
[114] Here, it is important to note that Ibn Taymiyya can be credited with being the source of "anti-clericalism" in both modernist Salafism and purist Salafism. Both movements are characterized by a desire to return to the sources and a disregard for the traditional authority of Islamic jurisprudential schools of thought. However, this anti-clericalism manifests in different ways for the two forms of Salafism since each form sets out to achieve different objectives.
[115] Rapoport and Ahmed, 4.
[116] Armstrong, 41.

The movements and ideologies analyzed above collectively constitute a continuous trend within Islamic intellectual history to engage in religious reform by reinstituting the fundamentals of Islam and purifying the tradition. The deep-seated desire to rediscover the original purity of Islam, it has been argued, has "always been present among Muslims peoples" and has manifested in the move to "return to a fundamentalist version of the religion, purified of such accretions and distortions as it was felt to have undergone."[117] Indeed, while historical contexts may change, the ideas remain constant as they surface time and again.

[117] Ozturk, Necati. "Islamic Orthodoxy Among the Ottomans in the Seventeenth Century with Special Reference to the Qadi-zade Movement" (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1981), 161-162.

CONCLUSION: CHALLENGING THE "RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM" CATEGORY

Since its completion, the Fundamentalism Project has continued not only to shape and influence scholarship on religious fundamentalism, but also to rather dominate the field. However, despite the project's widespread influence, a number of compelling alternative accounts of religious fundamentalism have been proposed and developed in recent years. Furthermore, the Fundamentalism Project is not impervious to criticism and has indeed been the focus of several critiques by other scholars. Ozzano summarizes these critiques and others into three major criticisms of the Fundamentalism Project: first, it is too influenced by the secularization paradigm; second, it is too inclusive and arbitrary in the choice of movements; and, finally, it is too dominated by religious studies scholars, thereby neglecting the political aspects of the phenomena.[1]

The first criticism of the mainstream formulation of "religious fundamentalism" as an explanatory category centers upon the influence exerted upon it by the secularization paradigm. Sherrie Aeschliman outlines some of these criticisms in her review of the *Fundamentalisms Comprehended* volume produced by the Fundamentalism Project. She contends that the capstone section of the volume, written by Almond, Sivan, and Appleby, demonstrates six assumptions and biases, three of which concern modernity and secularization. According to Aeschliman, the first assumption made by the authors is that "the project of modernity, despite its weaknesses, is legitimate and beneficial for the organization of society," and thus, "modernization theory is not problematic."[2] Related to the first, the second assumption made is that the secularization thesis poses no problems. Finally, the third bias evident in the Fundamentalism Project is

[1] Ozzano, 150.
[2] Aeschliman, 77.

"fundamentalists' substantive claims of discontent with modernity need not be taken seriously."[3] Saba Mahmood raises a parallel issue in her analysis of Islamism and fundamentalism, arguing that the Fundamentalism Project's analysis of fundamentalism and religion more generally "is consistent with the assumptions of theories of modernization that regard religion as antithetical to the development of democratic, modern societies."[4]

The second criticism leveled against the general construction of religious fundamentalism is that the term has been construed too broadly and inclusively. Susan Harding contends that "academic inquiry into fundamentalism is framed by modern presuppositions which presume 'fundamentalists' to be a socially meaningful category of persons who are significantly homogenous in regard to religious belief, interpretative practices, [and] moral compass."[5] In her view, necessary distinctions between fundamentalisms are largely absent from the literature, resulting in an oversimplification of the socioreligious and political realities of religious fundamentalists. This criticism, which instead advocates for the recognition of historical context and social reality, is closely tied to the fact that the Fundamentalism Project purports to provide a single, coherent, and cohesive definition of "religious fundamentalism" that is applicable to a vast array of fundamentalisms that span historical time, geographical location, and ideological underpinnings. The scholarship raises a similar point in its review of the Fundamentalism Project, wherein the construction of fundamentalism as a global category is critiqued. To make the point that the "global" aspect of fundamentalism is construed too broadly to be meaningful as a category, scholars point to the "immensity of differences that have to be brushed aside to view different forms of fundamentalism as the same conceptually."[6] Here, the brushing over of

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[3] Aeschliman, 77.
[4] Mahmood, Saba. "Islamism and Fundamentalism" (1994), 1.
[5] Harding, Susan. "Representing Fundamentalism: The Problem of the Repugnant Cultural Other" (1991), 374.
[6] Emerson, 130.

differences between American Protestant fundamentalism and Lebanese Muslim fundamentalism has been cited as an example.[7] As Frank Lechner captures the argument, the Fundamentalism Project treats the term fundamentalism "as an inductively generated analytical category that fits the actions of certain groups, those the goodness of fit is in dispute."[8]

Aside from the problematic nature of the Fundamentalism Project and its conclusions, there is a widespread notion in the scholarship that fundamentalism is an inherently modern response to modernity, a notion shared by the alternative conceptualizations of fundamentalism outlined above. Yet, other histories of religious fundamentalism suggest otherwise: several movements and figures in premodern history have also been designated "fundamentalist" by current scholarly works. Furthermore, a close examination of the development of Islamic fundamentalism, for example, reveals a continuous trend within Islamic intellectual history to engage in religious reform by reinstituting the fundamentals of Islam and purifying the tradition – an aim that modern religious fundamentalists also aspire to. Herein lies a discrepancy between the conceptualization of religious fundamentalism as an essentially modern phenomenon and the application of that concept in different contexts.

Each of the case studies analyzed herein has demonstrable ties to modern conceptualizations of Islamic fundamentalism, as evidenced by the presence of parallel foundational principles. As one work has described the interconnected nature of these movements, it is within the context of Islamic orthodoxy and Salafi ideology that "the efforts of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim, [Mehmed] Birgiwi, the Qadizadelis and Wahhabis should be viewed and evaluated."[9] Indeed, the broader intellectual history that has

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[7] Woodberry, Robert and Christian Smith. "Fundamentalism Et Al: Conservative Protestants in America" (1998), 27.

[8] Lechner, Frank. "Review: Fundamentalisms Observed" (1994), 360.

[9] *Ibid*, 409 – 410.

been traced from the fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Taymiyya (who is considered to be "the main source of Islamic radicalism or modern fundamentalism") all the way to modern Islamic fundamentalist movements poses a compelling challenge to current scholarship that characterizes Islamic fundamentalism as a purely modern phenomenon.[10] Because the current scholarship pinpoints the origins of Islamic fundamentalism as early as the 18th century with Wahhabism and as late as 1979 with the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the mere suggestion of the existence an intellectual genealogy that dates back to the fourteenth century challenges key assumptions in contemporary scholarship that view fundamentalism as essential "modern." Ultimately, analyzing modern Islamic fundamentalism in the broader context of Islamic intellectual history allows for the evolution of a more nuanced understanding of the various currents and components involved in the formation of such movements, an understanding that is absolutely necessary for the development of a more productive discourse.

Finally, the discussions outlined here raise a significant question as to whether it is fundamentalism that should be studied as a novel construct or modern secularism. In his response to this query, Steve Bruce states that "in the broad sweep of history fundamentalists are normal."[11] He claims that, in contrast to those who take religion seriously, "the liberal who supposes that his sacred texts are actually human constructions…, whose religion makes little difference to his life…: this is the strange and remarkable creature."[12] The Fundamentalism Project seems to counter this view by emphasizing the need to engage the modern resurgence of religion. However, by viewing religious movements as a response to the modern marginalization of religion, the Fundamentalism Project tends to reinforce the dominance of secularization and

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[10] Ozervali, M. Sait. "The Quranic Rational Theology of Ibn Taymiyya and his Criticism of the Mutakallimun" (2010), 78.
[11] Bruce, Steve. *Fundamentalism* (2000), 116-117.
[12] *Ibid*.

modernization narratives as the key variables for understanding modern religious revival. This analysis has attempted to pose some critical questions to this genealogical account.

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APPENDIX A: Pascendi Dominici Gregis (Excerpts)

PASCENDI DOMINICI GREGIS

ENCYCLICAL OF POPE PIUS X
ON THE DOCTRINES OF THE MODERNISTS

To the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops
and other Local Ordinaries in Peace
and Communion with the Apostolic See.

Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

The office divinely committed to Us of feeding the Lord's flock has especially this duty assigned to it by Christ, namely, to guard with the greatest vigilance the deposit of the faith delivered to the saints, rejecting the profane novelties of words and oppositions of knowledge falsely so called. There has never been a time when this watchfulness of the supreme pastor was not necessary to the Catholic body; for, owing to the efforts of the enemy of the human race, there have never been lacking "men speaking perverse things" (*Acts* xx. 30), "vain talkers and seducers" (*Tit*. i. 10), "erring and driving into error" (2 *Tim*. iii. 13). Still it must be confessed that the number of the enemies of the cross of Christ has in these last days increased exceedingly, who are striving, by arts, entirely new and full of subtlety, to destroy the vital energy of the Church, and, if they can, to overthrow utterly Christ's kingdom itself. Wherefore We may no longer be silent, lest We should seem to fail in Our most sacred duty, and lest the kindness that, in the hope of wiser counsels, We have hitherto shown them, should be attributed to forgetfulness of Our office.

Gravity of the Situation

2. That We make no delay in this matter is rendered necessary especially by the fact that the partisans of error are to be sought not only among the Church's open enemies; they lie hid, a thing to be deeply deplored and feared, in her very bosom and heart, and are the more mischievous, the less conspicuously they appear. We allude, Venerable Brethren, to many who belong to the Catholic laity, nay, and this is far more lamentable, to the ranks of the priesthood itself, who, feigning a love for the Church, lacking the firm protection of philosophy and theology, nay more, thoroughly imbued with the poisonous doctrines taught by the enemies of the Church, and lost to all sense of modesty, vaunt themselves as reformers of the Church; and, forming more boldly into line of attack, assail all that is most sacred in the work of Christ, not sparing even the person of the Divine Redeemer, whom, with sacrilegious daring, they reduce to a simple, mere man.

3. Though they express astonishment themselves, no one can justly be surprised that We number such men among the enemies of the Church, if, leaving out of consideration the internal

disposition of soul, of which God alone is the judge, he is acquainted with their tenets, their manner of speech, their conduct. Nor indeed will he err in accounting them the most pernicious of all the adversaries of the Church. For as We have said, they put their designs for her ruin into operation not from without but from within; hence, the danger is present almost in the very veins and heart of the Church, whose injury is the more certain, the more intimate is their knowledge of her. Moreover they lay the axe not to the branches and shoots, but to the very root, that is, to the faith and its deepest fires. And having struck at this root of immortality, they proceed to disseminate poison through the whole tree, so that there is no part of Catholic truth from which they hold their hand, none that they do not strive to corrupt. Further, none is more skilful, none more astute than they, in the employment of a thousand noxious arts; for they double the parts of rationalist and Catholic, and this so craftily that they easily lead the unwary into error; and since audacity is their chief characteristic, there is no conclusion of any kind from which they shrink or which they do not thrust forward with pertinacity and assurance. To this must be added the fact, which indeed is well calculated to deceive souls, that they lead a life of the greatest activity, of assiduous and ardent application to every branch of learning, and that they possess, as a rule, a reputation for the strictest morality. Finally, and this almost destroys all hope of cure, their very doctrines have given such a bent to their minds, that they disdain all authority and brook no restraint; and relying upon a false conscience, they attempt to ascribe to a love of truth that which is in reality the result of pride and obstinacy.

Once indeed We had hopes of recalling them to a better sense, and to this end we first of all showed them kindness as Our children, then we treated them with severity, and at last We have had recourse, though with great reluctance, to public reproof. But you know, Venerable Brethren, how fruitless has been Our action. They bowed their head for a moment, but it was soon uplifted more arrogantly than ever. If it were a matter which concerned them alone, We might perhaps have overlooked it: but the security of the Catholic name is at stake. Wherefore, as to maintain it longer would be a crime, We must now break silence, in order to expose before the whole Church in their true colours those men who have assumed this bad disguise.

Modernism and All the Heresies

39. It may be, Venerable Brethren, that some may think We have dwelt too long on this exposition of the doctrines of the Modernists. But it was necessary, both in order to refute their customary charge that We do not understand their ideas, and to show that their system does not consist in scattered and unconnected theories but in a perfectly organised body, all the parts of which are solidly joined so that it is not possible to admit one without admitting all. For this reason, too, We have had to give this exposition a somewhat didactic form and not to shrink from employing certain uncouth terms in use among the Modernists. And now, can anybody who takes a survey of the whole system be surprised that We should define it as the synthesis of all heresies? Were one to attempt the task of collecting together all the errors that have been broached against the faith and to concentrate the sap and substance of them all into one, he could not better succeed than the Modernists have done. Nay, they have done more than this, for, as we have already intimated, their system means the destruction not of the Catholic religion alone but of all religion. With good reason do the rationalists applaud them, for the most sincere and the frankest among the rationalists warmly welcome the modernists as their most valuable allies.

For let us return for a moment, Venerable Brethren, to that most disastrous doctrine of *agnosticism*. By it every avenue that leads the intellect to God is barred, but the Modernists would seek to open others available for sentiment and action. Vain efforts! For, after all, what is sentiment but the reaction of the soul on the action of the intelligence or the senses. Take away the intelligence, and man, already inclined to follow the senses, becomes their slave. Vain, too, from another point of view, for all these fantasias on the religious sentiment will never be able to destroy common sense, and common sense tells us that emotion and everything that leads the heart captive proves a hindrance instead of a help to the discovery of truth. We speak, of course, of truth in itself - as for that other purely *subjective* truth, the fruit of sentiment and action, if it serves its purpose for the jugglery of words, it is of no use to the man who wants to know above all things whether outside himself there is a God into whose hands he is one day to fall. True, the Modernists do call in *experience* to eke out their system, but what does this *experience* add to sentiment? Absolutely nothing beyond a certain intensity and a proportionate deepening of the conviction of the reality of the object. But these two will never make sentiment into anything but sentiment, nor deprive it of its characteristic which is to cause deception when the intelligence is not there to guide it; on the contrary, they but confirm and aggravate this characteristic, for the more intense sentiment is the more it is sentimental. In matters of religious sentiment and religious experience, you know, Venerable Brethren, how necessary is prudence and how necessary, too, the science which directs prudence. You know it from your own dealings with sounds, and especially with souls in whom sentiment predominates; you know it also from your reading of ascetical books - books for which the Modernists have but little esteem, but which testify to a science and a solidity very different from theirs, and to a refinement and subtlety of observation of which the Modernists give no evidence. Is it not really folly, or at least sovereign imprudence, to trust oneself without control to Modernist experiences? Let us for a moment put the question: if experiences have so much value in their eyes, why do they not attach equal weight to the experience that thousands upon thousands of Catholics have that the Modernists are on the wrong road? It is, perchance, that all experiences except those felt by the Modernists are false and deceptive? The vast majority of mankind holds and always will hold firmly that sentiment and experience alone, when not enlightened and guided by reason, do not lead to the knowledge of God. What remains, then, but the annihilation of all religion, - atheism? Certainly it is not the doctrine of *symbolism* - will save us from this. For if all the intellectual elements, as they call them, of religion are pure symbols, will not the very name of God or of divine personality be also a symbol, and if this be admitted will not the personality of God become a matter of doubt and the way opened to Pantheism? And to Pantheism that other doctrine of the *divine immanence* leads directly. For does it, We ask, leave God distinct from man or not? If yes, in what does it differ from Catholic doctrine, and why reject external revelation? If no, we are at once in Pantheism. Now the doctrine of immanence in the Modernist acceptation holds and professes that every phenomenon of conscience proceeds from man as man. The rigorous conclusion from this is the identity of man with God, which means Pantheism. The same conclusion follows from the distinction Modernists make between science and faith. The object of science they say is the reality of the knowable; the object of faith, on the contrary, is the reality of the unknowable. Now what makes the unknowable unknowable is its disproportion with the intelligible - a disproportion which nothing whatever, even in the doctrine of the Modernist, can suppress. Hence the unknowable remains and will eternally remain unknowable to the believer as well as to the man of science. Therefore if any religion at all is possible it can only be the religion of an unknowable reality. And why this religion might not be that universal

soul of the universe, of which a rationalist speaks, is something We do see. Certainly this suffices to show superabundantly by how many roads Modernism leads to the annihilation of all religion. The first step in this direction was taken by Protestantism; the second is made by Modernism; the next will plunge headlong into atheism.

REMEDIES

44. Against this host of grave errors, and its secret and open advance, Our Predecessor Leo XIII., of happy memory, worked strenuously especially as regards the Bible, both in his words and his acts. But, as we have seen, the Modernists are not easily deterred by such weapons - with an affectation of submission and respect, they proceeded to twist the words of the Pontiff to their own sense, and his acts they described as directed against others than themselves. And the evil has gone on increasing from day to day. We therefore, Venerable Brethren, have determined to adopt at once the most efficacious measures in Our power, and We beg and conjure you to see to it that in this most grave matter nobody will ever be able to say that you have been in the slightest degree wanting in vigilance, zeal or firmness. And what We ask of you and expect of you, We ask and expect also of all other pastors of souls, of all educators and professors of clerics, and in a very special way of the superiors of religious institutions.

I. - ***The Study of Scholastic Philosophy***

45. In the first place, with regard to studies, We will and ordain that scholastic philosophy be made the basis of the sacred sciences. It goes without saying that *if anything is met with among the scholastic doctors which may be regarded as an excess of subtlety, or which is altogether destitute of probability, We have no desire whatever to propose it for the imitation of present generations* (Leo XIII. Enc. *Aeterni Patris*). And let it be clearly understood above all things that the scholastic philosophy We prescribe is that which the Angelic Doctor has bequeathed to us, and We, therefore, declare that all the ordinances of Our Predecessor on this subject continue fully in force, and, as far as may be necessary, We do decree anew, and confirm, and ordain that they be by all strictly observed. In seminaries where they may have been neglected let the Bishops impose them and require their observance, and let this apply also to the Superiors of religious institutions. Further let Professors remember that they cannot set St. Thomas aside, especially in metaphysical questions, without grave detriment.

46. On this philosophical foundation the theological edifice is to be solidly raised. Promote the study of theology, Venerable Brethren, by all means in your power, so that your clerics on leaving the seminaries may admire and love it, and always find their delight in it. *For in the vast and varied abundance of studies opening before the mind desirous of truth, everybody knows how the old maxim describes theology as so far in front of all others that every science and art should serve it and be to it as handmaidens* (Leo XIII., Lett. ap. *In Magna*, Dec. 10, 1889). We will add that We deem worthy of praise those who with full respect for tradition, the Holy Fathers, and the ecclesiastical magisterium, undertake, with well-balanced judgment and guided by Catholic principles (which is not always the case), seek to illustrate positive theology by throwing the light of true history upon it. Certainly more attention must be paid to positive theology than in the past, but this must be done without detriment to scholastic theology, and

those are to be disapproved as of Modernist tendencies who exalt positive theology in such a way as to seem to despise the scholastic.

47. With regard to profane studies suffice it to recall here what Our Predecessor has admirably said: *Apply yourselves energetically to the study of natural sciences: the brilliant discoveries and the bold and useful applications of them made in our times which have won such applause by our contemporaries will be an object of perpetual praise for those that come after us* (Leo XIII. *Alloc*., March 7, 1880). But this do without interfering with sacred studies, as Our Predecessor in these most grave words prescribed: *If you carefully search for the cause of those errors you will find that it lies in the fact that in these days when the natural sciences absorb so much study, the more severe and lofty studies have been proportionately neglected - some of them have almost passed into oblivion, some of them are pursued in a half-hearted or superficial way, and, sad to say, now that they are fallen from their old estate, they have been dis figured by perverse doctrines and monstrous errors* (loco cit.). We ordain, therefore, that the study of natural science in the seminaries be carried on under this law.

II - ***Practical Application***

48. All these prescriptions and those of Our Predecessor are to be borne in mind whenever there is question of choosing directors and professors for seminaries and Catholic Universities. Anybody who in any way is found to be imbued with Modernism is to be excluded without compunction from these offices, and those who already occupy them are to be withdrawn. The same policy is to be adopted towards those who favour Modernism either by extolling the Modernists or excusing their culpable conduct, by criticising scholasticism, the Holy Father, or by refusing obedience to ecclesiastical authority in any of its depositaries; and towards those who show a love of novelty in history, archaeology, biblical exegesis, and finally towards those who neglect the sacred sciences or appear to prefer to them the profane. In all this question of studies, Venerable Brethren, you cannot be too watchful or too constant, but most of all in the choice of professors, for as a rule the students are modelled after the pattern of their masters. Strong in the consciousness of your duty, act always prudently but vigorously.

49. Equal diligence and severity are to be used in examining and selecting candidates for Holy Orders. Far, far from the clergy be the love of novelty! God hates the proud and the obstinate. For the future the doctorate of theology and canon law must never be conferred on anybody who has not made the regular course of scholastic philosophy; if conferred it shall be held as null and void. The rules laid down in 1896 by the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars for the clerics, both secular and regular, of Italy concerning the frequenting of the Universities, We now decree to be extended to all nations. Clerics and priests inscribed in a Catholic Institute or University must not in the future follow in civil Universities those courses for which there are chairs in the Catholic Institutes to which they belong. If this has been permitted anywhere in the past, We ordain that it be not allowed for the future. Let the Bishops who form the Governing Board of such Catholic Institutes or Universities watch with all care that these Our commands be constantly observed.

III. - *Episcopal Vigilance Over Publications*

50. It is also the duty of the bishops to prevent writings infected with Modernism or favourable to it from being read when they have been published, and to hinder their publication when they have not. No book or paper or periodical of this kind must ever be permitted to seminarists or university students. The injury to them would be equal to that caused by immoral reading - nay, it would be greater for such writings poison Christian life at its very fount. The same decision is to be taken concerning the writings of some Catholics, who, though not badly disposed themselves but ill-instructed in theological studies and imbued with modern philosophy, strive to make this harmonize with the faith, and, as they say, to turn it to the account of the faith. The name and reputation of these authors cause them to be read without suspicion, and they are, therefore, all the more dangerous in preparing the way for Modernism.

51. To give you some more general directions, Venerable Brethren, in a matter of such moment, We bid you do everything in your power to drive out of your dioceses, even by solemn interdict, any pernicious books that may be in circulation there. The Holy See neglects no means to put down writings of this kind, but the number of them has now grown to such an extent that it is impossible to censure them all. Hence it happens that the medicine sometimes arrives too late, for the disease has taken root during the delay. We will, therefore, that the Bishops, putting aside all fear and the prudence of the flesh, despising the outcries of the wicked, gently by all means but constantly, do each his own share of this work, remembering the injunctions of Leo XIII. in the Apostolic Constitution *Officiorum*: *Let the Ordinaries, acting in this also as Delegates of the Apostolic See, exert themselves to prescribe and to put out of reach of the faithful injurious books or other writings printed or circulated in their dioceses*. In this passage the Bishops, it is true, receive a right, but they have also a duty imposed on them. Let no Bishop think that he fulfils this duty by denouncing to us one or two books, while a great many others of the same kind are being published and circulated. Nor are you to be deterred by the fact that a book has obtained the *Imprimatur* elsewhere, both because this may be merely simulated, and because it may have been granted through carelessness or easiness or excessive confidence in the author as may sometimes happen in religious Orders. Besides, just as the same food does not agree equally with everybody, it may happen that a book harmless in one may, on account of the different circumstances, be hurtful in another. Should a Bishop, therefore, after having taken the advice of prudent persons, deem it right to condemn any of such books in his diocese, We not only give him ample faculty to do so but We impose it upon him as a duty to do so. Of course, it is Our wish that in such action proper regard be used, and sometimes it will suffice to restrict the prohibition to the clergy; but even in such cases it will be obligatory on Catholic booksellers not to put on sale books condemned by the Bishop. And while We are on this subject of booksellers, We wish the Bishops to see to it that they do not, through desire for gain, put on sale unsound books. It is certain that in the catalogues of some of them the books of the Modernists are not unfrequently announced with no small praise. If they refuse obedience let the Bishops have no hesitation in depriving them of the title of Catholic booksellers; so too, and with more reason, if they have the title of Episcopal booksellers, and if they have that of Pontifical, let them be denounced to the Apostolic See. Finally, We remind all of the XXVI. article of the abovementioned Constitution *Officiorum*: *All those who have obtained an apostolic faculty to read and keep forbidden books, are not thereby authorised to read books and periodicals forbidden by the local Ordinaries, unless the apostolic faculty expressly concedes permission to read and keep books condemned by anybody*.

IV. - ***Censorship***

52. But it is not enough to hinder the reading and the sale of bad books - it is also necessary to prevent them from being printed. Hence let the Bishops use the utmost severity in granting permission to print. Under the rules of the Constitution *Officiorum*, many publications require the authorisation of the Ordinary, and in some dioceses it has been made the custom to have a suitable number of official censors for the examination of writings. We have the highest praise for this institution, and We not only exhort, but We order that it be extended to all dioceses. In all episcopal Curias, therefore, let censors be appointed for the revision of works intended for publication, and let the censors be chosen from both ranks of the clergy - secular and regular - men of age, knowledge and prudence who will know how to follow the golden mean in their judgments. It shall be their office to examine everything which requires permission for publication according to Articles XLI. and XLII. of the above-mentioned Constitution. The Censor shall give his verdict in writing. If it be favourable, the Bishop will give the permission for publication by the word *Imprimatur*, which must always be preceded by the *Nihil obstat* and the name of the Censor. In the Curia of Rome official censors shall be appointed just as elsewhere, and the appointment of them shall appertain to the Master of the Sacred Palaces, after they have been proposed to the Cardinal Vicar and accepted by the Sovereign Pontiff. It will also be the office of the Master of the Sacred Palaces to select the censor for each writing. Permission for publication will be granted by him as well as by the Cardinal Vicar or his Vicegerent, and this permission, as above prescribed, must always be preceded by the *Nihil obstat* and the name of the Censor. Only on very rare and exceptional occasions, and on the prudent decision of the bishop, shall it be possible to omit mention of the Censor. The name of the Censor shall never be made known to the authors until he shall have given a favourable decision, so that he may not have to suffer annoyance either while he is engaged in the examination of a writing or in case he should deny his approval. Censors shall never be chosen from the religious orders until the opinion of the Provincial, or in Rome of the General, has been privately obtained, and the Provincial or the General must give a conscientious account of the character, knowledge and orthodoxy of the candidate. We admonish religious superiors of their solemn duty never to allow anything to be published by any of their subjects without permission from themselves and from the Ordinary. Finally We affirm and declare that the title of Censor has no value and can never be adduced to give credit to the private opinions of the person who holds it.

Priests as Editors

53. Having said this much in general, We now ordain in particular a more careful observance of Article XLII. of the above-mentioned Constitution *Officiorum*. It is *forbidden to secular priests, without the previous consent of the Ordinary, to undertake the direction of papers or periodicals*. This permission shall be withdrawn from any priest who makes a wrong use of it after having been admonished. With regard to priests who are *correspondents* or *collaborators* of periodicals, as it happens not unfrequently that they write matter infected with Modernism for their papers or periodicals, let the Bishops see to it that this is not permitted to happen, and, should they fail in this duty, let the Bishops make due provision with authority delegated by the Supreme Pontiff. Let there be, as far as this is possible, a special Censor for newspapers and periodicals written by Catholics. It shall be his office to read in due time each number after it has been published, and if

he find anything dangerous in it let him order that it be corrected. The Bishop shall have the same right even when the Censor has seen nothing objectionable in a publication.

V. **- *Congresses***

54. We have already mentioned congresses and public gatherings as among the means used by the Modernists to propagate and defend their opinions. In the future Bishops shall not permit Congresses of priests except on very rare occasions. When they do permit them it shall only be on condition that matters appertaining to the Bishops or the Apostolic See be not treated in them, and that no motions or postulates be allowed that would imply a usurpation of sacred authority, and that no mention be made in them of Modernism, presbyterianism, or laicism. At Congresses of this kind, which can only be held after permission in writing has been obtained in due time and for each case, it shall not be lawful for priests of other dioceses to take part without the written permission of their Ordinary. Further no priest must lose sight of the solemn recommendation of Leo XIII.: *Let priests hold as sacred the authority of their pastors, let them take it for certain that the sacerdotal ministry, if not exercised under the guidance of the Bishops, can never be either holy, or very fruitful or respectable* (Lett. Encyc. *Nobilissima Gallorum*, 10 Feb., 1884).

VI - ***Diocesan Watch Committees***

55. But of what avail, Venerable Brethren, will be all Our commands and prescriptions if they be not dutifully and firmly carried out? And, in order that this may be done, it has seemed expedient to Us to extend to all dioceses the regulations laid down with great wisdom many years ago by the Bishops of Umbria for theirs.

"In order," they say, "to extirpate the errors already propagated and to prevent their further diffusion, and to remove those teachers of impiety through whom the pernicious effects of such dif fusion are being perpetuated, this sacred Assembly, following the example of St. Charles Borromeo, has decided to establish in each of the dioceses a Council consisting of approved members of both branches of the clergy, which shall be charged the task of noting the existence of errors and the devices by which new ones are introduced and propagated, and to inform the Bishop of the whole so that he may take counsel with them as to the best means for nipping the evil in the bud and preventing it spreading for the ruin of souls or, worse still, gaining strength and growth" (Acts of the Congress of the Bishops of Umbria, Nov. 1849, tit 2, art. 6). We decree, therefore, that in every diocese a council of this kind, which We are pleased to name "the Council of Vigilance," be instituted without delay. The priests called to form part in it shall be chosen somewhat after the manner above prescribed for the Censors, and they shall meet every two months on an appointed day under the presidency of the Bishop. They shall be bound to secrecy as to their deliberations and decisions, and their function shall be as follows: They shall watch most carefully for every trace and sign of Modernism both in publications and in teaching, and, to preserve from it the clergy and the young, they shall take all prudent, prompt and efficacious measures. Let them combat novelties of words remembering the admonitions of Leo XIII. (Instruct. S.C. NN. EE. EE., 27 Jan., 1902): *It is impossible to approve in Catholic publications of a style inspired by unsound novelty which seems to deride the piety of the faithful and dwells on the introduction of a new order of Christian life, on new directions of the Church,*

on new aspirations of the modern soul, on a new vocation of the clergy, on a new Christian civilisation. Language of this kind is not to be tolerated either in books or from chairs of learning. The Councils must not neglect the books treating of the pious traditions of different places or of sacred relics. Let them not permit such questions to be discussed in periodicals destined to stimulate piety, neither with expressions savouring of mockery or contempt, nor by dogmatic pronouncements, especially when, as is often the case, what is stated as a certainty either does not pass the limits of probability or is merely based on prejudiced opinion. Concerning sacred relics, let this be the rule: When Bishops, who alone are judges in such matters, know for certain the a relic is not genuine, let them remove it at once from the veneration of the faithful; if the authentications of a relic happen to have been lost through civil disturbances, or in any other way, let it not be exposed for public veneration until the Bishop has verified it. The argument of prescription or well-founded presumption is to have weight only when devotion to a relic is commendable by reason of its antiquity, according to the sense of the Decree issued in 1896 by the Congregation of Indulgences and Sacred Relics: *Ancient relics are to retain the veneration they have always enjoyed except when in individual instances there are clear arguments that they are false or suppositions*. In passing judgment on pious traditions be it always borne in mind that in this matter the Church uses the greatest prudence, and that she does not allow traditions of this kind to be narrated in books except with the utmost caution and with the insertion of the declaration imposed by Urban VIII, and even then she does not guarantee the truth of the fact narrated; she simply does but forbid belief in things for which human arguments are not wanting. On this matter the Sacred Congregation of Rites, thirty years ago, decreed as follows: *These apparitions and revelations have neither been approved nor condemned by the Holy See, which has simply allowed that they be believed on purely human faith, on the tradition which they relate, corroborated by testimonies and documents worthy of credence* (Decree, May 2, 1877). Anybody who follows this rule has no cause for fear. For the devotion based on any apparition, in as far as it regards the fact itself, that is to say in as far as it is *relative*, always implies the hypothesis of the truth of the fact; while in as far as it is absolute, it must always be based on the truth, seeing that its object is the persons of the saints who are honoured. The same is true of relics. Finally, We entrust to the Councils of Vigilance the duty of overlooking assiduously and diligently social institutions as well as writings on social questions so that they may harbour no trace of Modernism, but obey the prescriptions of the Roman Pontiffs.

VII - ***Triennial Returns***

56. Lest what We have laid down thus far should fall into oblivion, We will and ordain that the Bishops of all dioceses, a year after the publication of these letters and every three years thenceforward, furnish the Holy See with a diligent and sworn report on all the prescriptions contained in them, and on the doctrines that find currency among the clergy, and especially in the seminaries and other Catholic institutions, and We impose the like obligation on the Generals of Religious Orders with regard to those under them.

57. This, Venerable Brethren, is what we have thought it our duty to write to you for the salvation of all who believe. The adversaries of the Church will doubtless abuse what we have said to refurbish the old calumny by which we are traduced as the enemy of science and of the progress of humanity. In order to oppose a new answer to such accusations, which the history of the Christian religion refutes by never failing arguments, it is Our intention to establish and

develop by every means in our power a special Institute in which, through the co-operation of those Catholics who are most eminent for their learning, the progress of science and other realms of knowledge may be promoted under the guidance and teaching of Catholic truth. God grant that we may happily realise our design with the ready assistance of all those who bear a sincere love for the Church of Christ. But of this we will speak on another occasion.

58. Meanwhile, Venerable Brethren, fully confident in your zeal and work, we beseech for you with our whole heart and soul the abundance of heavenly light, so that in the midst of this great perturbation of men's minds from the insidious invasions of error from every side, you may see clearly what you ought to do and may perform the task with all your strength and courage. May Jesus Christ, the author and finisher of our faith, be with you by His power; and may the Immaculate Virgin, the destroyer of all heresies, be with you by her prayers and aid. And We, as a pledge of Our affection and of divine assistance in adversity, grant most affectionately and with all Our heart to you, your clergy and people the Apostolic Benediction.

Given at St. Peter's, Rome, on the 8th day of September, 1907, the fifth year of our Pontificate.

PIUS X

APPENDIX B: Characteristics of Fundamentalist Groups Table

TABLE 1 Nine characteristics of fundamentalists groups[a]

Ideological	1. **Reactivity to the marginalization of religion:** Fundamentalism is first and foremost a defense of a religious tradition, a tradition perceived to be eroding or under attack by the processes of modernization and secularization. Without this characteristic, a movement is not properly labeled fundamentalist.
	2. **Selectivity:** Fundamentalism is selective. Rather than simply defending a religious tradition, it selects and reshapes aspects of the tradition, particularly aspects that clearly distinguish the fundamentalists from the mainstream (see also Antoun 2001). What is more, such movements affirm and use some aspects of modernity, such as much of modern science and modern forms of communication and other technologies. Finally, certain consequences or processes of modernity are singled out for special attention and focused opposition (such as abortion for U.S. Christian fundamentalists).
	3. **Dualistic worldview:** Reality is clearly divided into the good and the evil, light and darkness, righteousness and unrighteousness.
	4. **Absolutism and inerrancy:** The text of the tradition (the Torah, Qur'an, or Bible, for example) "are of divine (inspired) origin and true and accurate in all particulars" (Almond et al. 2003, p. 96). Fundamentalist movements in religions that do not have a clear sacred text (such as Hinduism) often privilege one text (or set of texts) over others.
	5. **Millenialism and messianism:** History has a miraculous and holy end. At the end of time, at the entry or return of the hoped-for one (the messiah, the hidden Imam, etc.), suffering will end, evil will be vanquished, and believers will be victorious. The Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) offer the most certain assurances; non-Abrahamic traditions, although tending to borrow from Abrahamic religion's "end times" certainty, lack such fully elaborated assurances.
Organizational	1. **Elect, chosen membership:** Those in fundamentalist movements view themselves as called, selected out, set apart for their mission to defend the religious tradition.
	2. **Sharp boundaries:** People are either in the fundamentalist group or they are not. The boundaries are clearly set; there is no confusion. One is saved, righteous, a follower of Allah, a defender of the faith, or one is not.
	3. **Authoritarian organization:** Fundamentalist movements are typically organized around charismatic leaders, with others the followers. The leader (or leaders) is viewed by the followers as specially chosen by their deity, someone with near supernatural qualities or special access to the deity, virtuous, a model for the followers, and one with special training and insight into the sacred texts.
	4. **Behavioral requirements:** As an extension of the dualistic worldview and creating sharp boundaries, behavioral requirements are both elaborate and specific. Rules about appropriate speech, dress, sexuality, drinking, eating, family formation, children, entertainment pursuits, and other behaviors are common.

[a]Based on the findings of Almond et al. (1995).